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Abstract
Ever since the dawn of internet, a new wave of fast-growing software companies has
emerged. The M&A scholars have struggled to find appropriate valuation mechanisms
for unprofitable companies with ultra-high revenue growth. To overcome the uncertain
future, a contractual provision called earnout is often used. An earnout is a contractual
provision in a M&A-deal that states the seller of the business is to obtain additional
compensation in the future if the business achieves certain metrics.
The purpose of this study is to contribute to practice and nascent literature by exploring
and evaluating metrics for SaaS-companies that can be used in earnouts. The study applies
Lean Anaslytics to suggest a framework for choosing what metrics to use, and discusses
how to avoid sub-optimisation and metric manipulation.
In order to answer the research questions, a qualitative, exploratory and abductive method-
ology was used. The study combines a literature and thought leader review and interviews
to explore certain areas, with a case study that applies the findings.
The study suggests that the process for determining metrics should start with the buyer’s
acquisitions strategy. For acquisitions where the objective is to access talent, technology
or accelerate product road-map, the study has shown that earnouts in most cases not be
used at all. If the acquisition is made based on financial objectives, Lean Analytics can
be used to determine what stage the seller’s company is in. Understanding what stage
the company is in is crucial as the type of metrics that matter differ depending on stage.
The study suggests that the most suitable earnout metric for M&A based on financial
objectives is monthly recurring revenue (MRR). The metric must be clearly defined so it
cannot be manipulated. The reason why many other metrics from Lean Analytics cannot
be used is that they are vulnerable to manipulation and can restrict the operating freedom
for the entrepreneur.
Keywords: Lean Analytics, mergers and acquisitions, SaaS, earnouts, SaaS metrics, star-
tups, technology, venture capital.

Sammanfattning
Sedan början av internet har en stor mängd snabbväxande mjukvarubolag vuxit upp.
Forskare och utövare av företagsförvärv har brottats med att hitta ett lämpligt sätt att
värdera olönsamma bolag med mycket hög omsättningstillväxt då normala finansiella mod-
eller inte kan appliceras. För att brygga risken med den osäkra framtiden vid förvärv av
denna typ av företag används en prismekanism som kallas för tilläggsköpeskilling. Tilläg-
gsköpeskilling är en prismekanism som används för att säljaren av företaget ska få yt-
terligare kompensation om de når upp till vissa speciella prestationsmått, efter en viss
tid.
Syftet med studien är att bidra till innovationslitteratur, och applikationen av den, genom
att utforska och utvärdera prestationsmått som mjukvarubolag med prenumerationsmod-
eller kan använda vid transaktione r med tilläggsköpeskilling. Uppsatsen applicerar Lean
Analytics för att föreslå ett ramverk som kan användas för att välja rätt prestationsmått,
samt diskuterar hur man kan undvika suboptimering och manipulation av prestationsmåt-
ten.
För att svara på frågeställningarna har författaren använt en kvalitativ, explorativ och
abduktiv metod. Uppsatsen kombinerar en litteraturöversikt och intervjuer för att utforska
vissa områden, med en fallstudie för att applicera upptäckterna.
Denna studie föreslår att processen av att bestämma prestationsmått i tilläggsköpeskilling
börjar med köparens förvärvsstrategi. Om målet med förvärvet är att få tillgång till hu-
mankapital, teknologi eller att accelerera produktutvecklingen, så har studien visat att
tilläggsköpeskilling inte bör användas alls. Om det är finansiella mål med förvärvet så
kan Lean Analytics användas för att bestämma vilket skede säljarens bolag är i. Detta då
relevanta nyckeltal varierar mellan olika skeden som mjukvarubolag går igenom. Studien
visar att det bäst lämpade prestationsmåttet är månadsvis återkommande prenumera-
tionsintäkter (MRR). Nyckeltalet bör tydligt definieras så att det inte kan manipuleras
med bokföring. Anledningen till att andra nyckeltal från Lean Analytics inte bör användas
är att de är sårbara för manipulation och kan begränsa den operativa friheten.
Nyckelord: Lean Analytics, förvärv och fusioner, mjukvarubolag, tilläggsköpeskilling, ny-
ckeltal, SaaS, teknologi, riskkapital, .
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Vocabulary
SaaS
Software-as-a-Service is a software licensing and delivery model in which software is li-
censed on a subscription basis and is centrally hosted. I
KPI
Key Performance Indicator. The metrics that are important when analysing how a com-
pany is doing.
GAAP
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles is the accounting standard adopted by the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It is a standard framework of guidelines for
financial accounting with metrics such as revenue, EBIT and profit.
CRM
Customer relationship management is an approach to manage a company’s interaction
with current and potential customers. Often referred to as the software solution where
customer data is stored and accessed.
M&A Mergers and acquisitions is a general term that refers to the consolidation of com-
panies or assets.
Corporate Development
Corporate development refers to the planning and execution of strategies to meet the
company’s objectives. For large technology companies, this is the division who handles
mergers and acquisitions within the company.
Earnout An earnout is a contractual provision in M&A stating that the seller of a busi-
ness is to obtain additional compensation in the future if the business achieves certain
objectives.
The Lean Startup The Lean Startup is a methodology for developing businesses and
products, which aims to shorten product development cycles and reduce waste. It attempts
to accomplish this by adopting a combination of hypothesis-driven experimentation, iter-
ative product releases, and validated learning.
Lean Analytics A develoipment of The Lean Staetup. The core idea behind Lean An-
alytics is that by knowing the kind of business you are, and the stage you’re at, you can
track and optimise the One Metric That Matters to your startup right now.
i

Chapter 1
Introduction
The introduction aims to give the reader a general understanding of the topic as proper
background to the problems and research that the thesis explores. The purpose and research
questions are presented as well as important background information
1.1 Backgroud
Since the late 1990s, a new type of company has emerged: the fast-growing technology
startup. These fast-growing startups are usually highly unprofitable and often show close
to no revenue. Yet, what originally looked like ludicrous pyramid schemes with no signs
of profitability, has turned into the hegemonic incumbents of the 21st century. These new
technology ventures require unconventional and sophisticated frameworks to manage and
understand [16]. The classic management literature has been geared toward manufacturing
companies and is insufficient to understand these nascent and disruptive organisations [37].
The emergence of technology startups has also brought a new form of financing with it:
venture capital. The venture capital funds invest in promising startups with the aim of
reaching liquidity through an IPO or M&A [19]. As the venture capital funds seek to
return money to their investors, the M&A activity for small and fast-growing technology
companies has skyrocketed[6]. Traditionally, the valuation of a company has often been
tied it’s financials such as revenue, profit or cash-flow . However, this is not an applicable
model when a company may have very low revenue but extremely high growth [16]. A
common way to overcome this problem in M&A is to use a mechanism called earnout
[10]. An earnout is a contractual provision in a M&A-deal that states the seller of the
business is to obtain additional compensation in the future if the business achieves certain
objectives [25]. A very simplified example could be:
A company gets sold at a valuation of £10M. The earnout provision then states
that sellers will obtain an additional payment of £10M if they manage to grow
revenue by 200% during the next twelve months. In this case annual revenue
growth is the metric used in the earnout, 200% is the milestone and one year
is the length of the earnout [40]
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The core problem with earnouts is that they are designed for traditional profitable com-
panies but applied for early stage technology businesses [40]. Since a significant share of
earnouts lead to disagreement over outcome, many argue that earnouts simply converts
today’s disagreement over price into tomorrow’s legal litigation over the outcome [25].
Clearly, the only parties benefiting from litigations are the lawyers who write the con-
tracts and can earn additional fees. Not only is this bad for the company itself, it is also
hindering innovation and job creation.
During the past 15 years, a new field of management literature has been written to help
entrepreneurs manage the risk and high uncertainty that is in the nature of startups.
This include books like The Lean Startup, Lean Analytics, The Innovator’s Dilemma,
Change by Design and The Innovator’s Method [20]. The author’s hypothesis is that an
interdisciplinary understanding of corporate finance, innovation, financial controlling and
venture capital is needed to suggest the perfect earnout. This study focuses on using
nascent startup literature to create a better way of valuating, selling and acquiring early
stage software-as-a-service (SaaS) companies. In particular, it will focus on using tailored
software metrics in earnouts as opposed to traditional accounting metrics such as: revenue,
EBIT, EBITDA and profit.
1.1.1 SaaS and the subscription economy
Software as a Service (SaaS) is a software delivery model that during the past ten years
has become a leading model for B2B enterprise software. Examples of leading enterprise
software companies with a SaaS model are: Salesforce, Adobe, Slack and Zendesk. As
opposed to the perpetual license model that was used in the beginning of the 21st century,
the SaaS model is built on subscription payments [34]. It is a great example of the devel-
opment of the subscription economy, which makes revenues from subscriptions rather than
sales. The time period varies between businesses and type of software, but traditionally
monthly or annual subscriptions are used. This leads to a customer acquisition model
where the company pays upfront for acquiring customers and get payed back in revenue
over time [44]. This model affects both the company’s cash flow as well as the metrics used
in financial controlling. Cash-flow deficit during the growth is usually funded by venture
capital [13]. The subscription model requires different metrics than a traditional company
due to the recurring revenue model, scalability and different cost-structure [32]. Since the
metrics for SaaS-companies differs from traditional manufacturing businesses, a new and
way of setting metrics in earnouts that is adapted to subscription models is needed.
1.1.2 Why metrics matter
The importance of measuring metrics that matter was observed already in 1966 by Peter
Drucker with his famous quote: "What gets measured gets improved". [1]. Obsessing over
a few key metrics will give visibility on progress, create accountability among employees
and provide a clear focus for the organisation [31]. Today, organisations have better ca-
pabilities than ever to develop sophisticated scorecards from data analysis. Organisations
must develop capabilities to analyse data and turn it into actionable metrics that matter.
Every business leader today should ask themselves: how do we know we are improving
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things that matter for the overall success of the business [16]? Increased accuracy, accessi-
bility, predictive capability, cost- and time effectiveness of analysis, and talent availability
has made it possible for technically savvy companies today to be data-driven and make
decisions based on information as opposed to not intuition[31]. As Alistair Croll and
Benjamin Yoskovitz famously put it: "Instincts are experiments. Data is proof." [16].
1.1.3 Venture capital and its implications on exits
The clear majority of fast-growing and successful early stage SaaS-businesses are funded
by venture capital [13]. The institutional venture capital fund raises capital from its
limited partners, such as pension funds and university endowment funds, with the aim of
liquidating the fund and returning capital to the limited partners after ten years. There
are three ways a venture capital fund can get return on their investment: the startup starts
paying dividends, the startup goes through a merger or acquisition, or the startup goes
through an Initial Public Offering (IPO)[6]. Out of these three options, paying dividends
is almost never a practically viable option due to the time it takes to get cash-flow positive
and the small potential return for the venture capital fund. Hence, the only way for the
venture capital fund to return cash to their investors is through a liquidation event, i.e.
through an IPO or M&A [19]. This fundamentally change the planned trajectory of the
startup, as it will need to plan for an exit within ten years after receiving its first venture
capital investment. Since most of the M&A activity is private information, the real number
is much higher. This data suggest that M&A is the primary exit option for startups and
a crucial element for entrepreneurs, venture capitalists and employees (whom usually are
rewarded through an option scheme).
1.1.4 The earnout provision in M&A
An earnout is a contractual provision in a M&A-deal that states the seller of the business is
to obtain additional compensation in the future if the business achieves certain objectives.
Typically, an earnout is used to bridge the valuation gap between the acquirer and the
seller, particularly for companies with high but uncertain growth [41]. The metrics are
usually expressed in terms of financial goals such as revenue, net income or EBIDTA, but
sometimes non-financial metrics such as product milestones are used [23]. For financial
metrics, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) is almost always used[25].
M&A earnouts are particularly well-used for small but fast-growing technology businesses
with low real assets [23].
It is of interest for both the seller and the acquirer of the business to align the metrics
used in an earnout with the future success of the company. The earnout should also be
structured in a way that makes it hard to reach the metrics through sub-optimisation.
A common problem related to sup-optimisation is that the sellers are vulnerable to the
acquirer’s action and decisions post-closing [25]. For instance, there has been examples
of where the acquirer allocates inadequate resources to sell the product or simply stop
selling the product at all [15]. This is commonly referred to as "The issue of control"
and is one of the main reasons why many earnouts lead to legal litigation [25]. Usually,
provisions regarding good faith and reasonable effort are used to restrict the acquirer’s
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ability to interfere with the seller reaching the milestones. However, as mentioned begore
it has been argued that an earnout simply "converts today’s disagreement in price to
tomorrow’s litigation over the outcome". In 2013, 40% of M&A deals in USA involved
some type of earnout provisions [52]. 30% of earnouts use revenue as metric, 32% use
EBIDTA. Non-financial metrics are primarily used for life-science and research-driven
cases where product launch and FDA-approval are the most commonly used milestones.
The length of an earnout varies between 1-4 years with 56% being shorter than two years
[30].
1.1.5 The Lean Startup & Lean Analytics
Eric Ries published the book The Lean Startup in 2011, in which he argues that star-
tups should work cross-functionally, iterative and hypothesis-driven to waste as little time
and resources as possible. Ries argues that startups act under conditions of extreme
uncertainty and should thus focus on going through has many iterations of the "build-
measure-learn" feedback-loop as possible[20]. The Lean Startup methodology has gained
international acceptance and has been implemented in countless organisations [33]. Lean
analytics is an expansion of the lean startup methodology focusing on the “measure” stage
in the build-measure-learn cycle. The methodology focuses on finding the right and action-
able metrics that matter for start-ups and to provide a methodology for setting objectives:
to “draw a line in the sand”. It is using building blocks from customer development, lean
startup and agile development with a focus on how to set and follow-up KPIs in accordance
to these methodologies. Lean analytics use the fundamental insights of The Lean Startup
to propose metrics and accounting principles that are designed for the iterative nature of
a startup, as opposed to the GAAP that mostly apply to traditional businesses.[16]
1.2 Problem description
Traditional valuation models based on revenue and profit are less applicable to fast-growing
technology startups with low revenue and no profit [43]. To overcome this, most acquisi-
tions use an earnout provisions to bridge the valuation gap between the seller’s and the
buyer’s expectations of future growth [25]. However, traditional GAAP metrics such as
revenue and net income are used as milestones in the contract [10]. The metrics used in
earnouts will impact the seller’s focus after the acquisition. Thus the problem is preva-
lent post-transaction. Many of these rapidly growing software startups have subscription
models with recurring revenue. SaaS-companies use different metrics than GAAP to mea-
sure unit economics [SaaS2]. Furthermore, pre-mature scaling of technology businesses
is detrimental for the company [16]. In the early stages, revenues are not necessarily the
best indicators of success. Therefore, there is a need to suggest more appropriate metrics
in earnouts for SaaS-businesses.
There are many actors involved in an MA for a SaaS-business: entrepreneurs, venture
capitalists, corporate development departments, acquiring management and lawyers [25].
Both sides of the table need a thorough understanding of innovation, the SaaS-model,
data analytics, accounting, corporate finance and legal provisions, to successfully suggest
an M&A earnout provision. We can also note that a significant amount of earouts lead to
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legal litigation, which clearly shows that there is a fundamental flaw with how earnouts
are designed today [10]. Hence, the conclusion can be drawn that there is a huge need for
cross-functional expertise in the development of the earnout, particularly for SaaS.
1.3 Purpose
The purpose of this study is to contribute to practice and nascent literature by exploring
and evaluating metrics for SaaS-companies that can be used in earnouts, and in particular
those presented by Lean Analytics. The study aims to suggest a framework for using
earnouts in SaaS M&A that is fit for purpose and constructed for innovation rather than
built from the traditional principles of accounting and finance. By doing so the author
hopes to give entrepreneurs, venture capitalists and corporate development teams a better
way to use earnouts in the M&A process for SaaS-businesses. By doing so, the author
hopes to decrease chances of litigation and align incentives between sellers and acquirers of
the company. The framework suggested in this study can in the long run boost innovation
through increasing the entrepreneurs’ degrees of freedom post-acquisition. It should also
facilitate M&A in early stages, allowing founders and investors to find earlier exit paths
which would de-risk entrepreneurship and enhance innovation. The findings are aimed to
be used by all parts involved in a SaaS M&A as an interdisciplinary study aligning all
parties.
1.4 Research Questions
• RQ(1) What performance metrics would be most appropriate to use in an earnout
for SaaS-businesses?
– What characteristics of the business needs to considered?
– How should metrics be set to avoid one part reaching them through subopti-
misation?
• RQ(2) How can Lean Analytics be applied to the process of determining perfor-
mance metrics
1.5 Delimitations
The companies for which the earnouts will be examined should have a Software as a Service
(SaaS) model in place as their primarily business model. The thesis closely examines a
tailored model for metrics in earnouts, which is why the target group must be specialised
for the findings to be applicable across the larger sector. SaaS-businesses are also a suitable
example since the model is highly data-driven and tracking metrics are at the core of the
CEOs job. SaaS reach statistical significance on their metrics early on in their trajectory
and which increase the ability to be data-driven in an accurate, specific and experimental
6 Chapter 1. Introduction
way. Furthermore, the SaaS-businesses should have more than $50k in monthly recurring
revenue (MRR). Before this stage there is rarely enough data (depending on the annual
contract value) to analyse with statistical significance and therefore metrics are not yet
core to the business mode. Furthermore, the thesis will only examine SaaS statups that
are funded by venture capital at seed-stage and onwards. Venture capital impact the
planned growth trajectory and the need to seek acquisition.
There are many intricate aspects of designing an M&A earnout such as number of tiers,
earnout length, caps and thresholds, litigation clauses and post-closing operations. How-
ever, this study will only focus on the metrics used in the earnout and exclude all other
parts of the earnout. The author calls upon further research to be done to examine the
legal implications of using non-GAAP metrics in earnouts, which is out of scope in this
study.
1.6 Thesis outline
1.6.1 Introduction
The introduction aims to give the reader a general understanding of the topic as proper
background to the problems and research that the thesis explores. The purpose and
research questions are presented as well as important background information.
1.6.2 Methodology
The methodology chapter aims to present and justify the choice of research methodology
that has been applied in this study. The research strategy, research methodology, research
design are presented followed by a description of data collection and data analysis. The
chapter ends with a discussion around the study’s trustworthiness.
1.6.3 Theory
This chapter presents the theoretical framework on which the empirical data and analysis
build upon. It aims to give the reader the necessary theoretical building blocks on which
the argumentation and conclusions are based in the later chapters.
1.6.4 Empirics
In this chapter is divided into two parts. The first part presents the findings from the
interviews and the second chapter presents the data for the case study company that has
been analysed. The data and metrics that are presented in the latter part are from the
theoretical framework in previous chapter.
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1.6.5 Analysis
The analysis aims to analyse how earnouts are constructed through both the lens of the
acquirer and the seller. In the second part of this chapter, the analysis is applied to the
empirical data from the case study company.
1.6.6 Conclusion
The conclusion aims to answer the initial research questions. it also provides an example
of how the findings can be applied by suggesting a fictional earnout on the case study
company.
1.6.7 Discussion
In this chapter the author discusses the implications and limitations of the study. Fur-
thermore, suggestions for future research are provided.

Chapter 2
Methodology
The methodology chapter aims to present and justify the choice of research methodology
that has been applied in this study. The research strategy, research methodology, research
design are presented followed by a description of data collection and data analysis. The
chapter ends with a discussion around the study’s trustworthiness.
2.1 Research strategy
Research can either take a qualitative approach, quantitative approach or a mix of both[8].
A quantitative research methodology attempts to quantify and measure results by applying
statistical analysis. The quantitative approach needs a larger data set to draw conclusions
about the broader population [17] A qualitative study is often appropriate when the re-
search aims to fill an unexplored field of study regarding certain concepts, conditions and
implications. Qualitative analysis is usually suitable when the state of prior theory and
research on a certain topic is nascent The research methodology is thus particularly useful
within relatively young or unexplored research fields [4].
The purpose of this study is to develop a new framework for setting metrics in an M&A
earnout for SaaS-businesses. Since this is an area for which limited academic research
has been conducted, a qualitative approach was deemed appropriate. However, since the
metrics used in earnouts are of quantitative nature there will be quantitative elements to
the study though the research method itself is qualitative.
The research approach is also defined by its purpose and characteristics. It can either
be descriptive, problem-solving, explanatory or exploratory. A descriptive approach seeks
to investigate and describe the field, a problem-solving approach seeks to find a solution
to a proposed problem and a explanatory approach look for explanations and reasons on
how something works. An exploratory approach is used to explore deeply how something
works and is particularly used when there is little prior research in the area and the field
of study is previously unexplored [11]. Since the purpose of this study is explore a better
way to use Lean Analytics in constructing M&A earnouts for SaaS-businesses, this study
will undertake an exploratory approach.
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A reasoning approach can either be inductive, abductive or deductive. Deductive rea-
soning is most often used in quantitative studies as it implies a data collection measured
against an initial hypothesis. An inductive reasoning approach applies that theory should
be derived from data alone. An abductive approach implies that theory is built through
the interaction between theory and empirics. It is about the interaction between ideas,
observations and the nascent research field. [5]. When a qualitative research approach is
chosen, an abductive reasoning is often used as a process of discovering and understand-
ing an emergent field. Flexibility and an iterative process was deemed appropriate and
therefore the abductive approach was chosen in this study.
2.2 Research methodology
There are four different types of research design methods: experiment, survey, action re-
search and case study [11]. The choice of research design method depends on the objectives
and characteristics of the study. In this dissertation, the used methodologies are a case
study and a survey.
An experiment is not appropriate for this study as the purpose is not to explain causal
relationships, nor is it possible to conduct an experiment with isolated variables. Ac-
tion research was deemed to be an inappropriate method for this study due to the long
feedback cycles in M&A earnouts and the difficulty to study the effects as it is private
information covered by non-disclosure agreements. As this study aims to develop a new
way of structuring M&A earnouts for SaaS-businesses, a survey will be used as a part of
the methodology. In addition to the survey, a case study was deemed appropriate since
M&A earnouts for SaaS-businesses is a multidimensional topic and the research is planned
to be done in an iterative manner
2.3 Research design
The research design is the logical sequence of methods that connects the initial research
question and ultimately answer its conclusions[22]. The purpose of research design is to
tie the parts together and to make sure that the initial questions are answered. The
methodology used in this study is a combination of interviews with a case study. The
research process begins with a literature and review to synthesise the academic research
that has previously been conducted around software metrics in general and Lean Analytics
in particular. The thought leader review then then gathers additional information from
industry experts to complement the knowledge from academia and gain best practices
from practitioners. The thought leader review gathers interviews and essays written by
people involved in the SaaS M%A process to find best-practices for both SaaS metrics
and M&A earnouts. The theoretical framework is then synthesised, and interviews are
conducted to gain more insights into important areas where the literature and though
leader review are insufficient. The findings are then applied in a case study on a company
where metrics for M&A earnouts are suggested in line with the best practices that are
discovered in the literature and thought leader review. The case study acts as an example
of how an earnout could be constructed with SaaS metrics. Since every case is different
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and the metrics must be tailored to each company, the case study gives a specific example
of how the framework and findings can be applied in practice.
The work is conducted in an iterative manner between literature review, data collection
and analysis.
Figure 2.1: The work process
2.3.1 Literature and thought leader review
A literature review was conducted in an iterative manner to build the theoretical frame-
work on which this thesis builds upon. It involved keyword searches in LUBsearch, Google
Scholar and other academic databases. The aim was to gain fundamental insight into all
areas around M&A earnouts to deepen the understanding of what aspects need to be
considered in the process of determining performance metrics. A review of what thought
leaders in the industry think is conducted to complement the existing theoretical frame-
work from the literature review. Data for the theoretical framework is thus gathered both
from a literature review and a though leader review, both presented under the theory
chapter. The thought leader review gathers interviews and essays written by people in-
volved in the SaaS M&A process to find best-practices for both SaaS metrics and M&A
earnouts. The aim of the review is to get insights from all different fields that are involved
in the M&A process. This was important as a inter-disciplinary design of the earnout
provision is at its core in this study. The primary content that has been analysed is pre-
recorded interviews and essays written by people from corporate development, lawyers,
venture capitalists, innovators and SaaS management teams. Interviews are a good way to
make unexpected discoveries [26]. Content from at least three people from each discipline
has been analysed in order to give a thorough and broad understanding of the issue. Each
person has gone through a process of validation to make sure that the right person is being
interviewed, that they are considered industry experts and that the people are who they
say they are. A synopsis of topics and search queries for the literature and thought leader
survey is presented in the table below:
The databases in which searches were conducted are: Google Scholar, LUB-Search and
Medium.
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Research topic Search Queries & Keywords
Software metrics SaaS metrics, Software KPI, SaaS accounting, Cohort Analysis,
Lean Analytics Lean metrics, Lean Analytics critique, Lean Analytics SaaS
Earnouts Earnout metric, Earnout problems, Earnout Litigation, Earnout Soft-ware, &A earnouts
Acquisition strategies SaaS acquisitions, Technology acquisitions, Acquisition strategy, M&Astrategy
Metrics and KPIs KPI, Metricc acquisition, Balanced Scorecard
Table 2.1: Literature review topics, search queries and keywords.
2.3.2 Semi-structured interviews
After the initial literature and thought leader reviews were conducted, the semi-structured
interviews took place. Six interviews with relevant people with insight into the M&A
process of early stage technology companies was conducted. The interviews focused on
complementing the literature and thought leader review with additional insights. The
interviews were semi-structured and done by telephone or in person. . The topics of
discussion were acquisition strategies, measuring success of acquisitions and the problems
with earnouts. Corporate development departments are usually leding the M&A process
when large technology companies are acquiring startups. Thus, three interviews were con-
ducted with corporate development to gain insights into acquisition strategies. Interview
guides can be found in Appendix 1.
Research topic Name Company Role
Acquisition strategies Matt Switzer Hootsuite SVP Corporare Devel-opment
Acquisition strategies Bram Sugarman Shopify Corporare DevelopmentLead
Acquisition strategies James Loftus Square Corporare DevelopmentLead
Earnouts EeswaranNavaratnam 01 Ventures General Partner
Earnouts Aleksis Tapper Castrén & Snell-man M&A Lawyer
Case interview Samir Smajic GetAccept CEO and Co-founder
Table 2.2: Literature review topics, search queries and keywords.
2.3.3 Case study design
A case study investigates a particular situation or phenomenon. It is a method that sys-
tematically analyse a particular situation. A qualitative case study should be descriptive,
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heuristic, inductive and particularistic [2]. A case study can be a single or multiple case
study and take on an embedded or holistic approach [22]. A study of multiple case units
generally consumes more resources and time but is considered to be more robust than a
single case unit study. The case study in this dissertation is a single case study since the
objective is to apply the best practices observed in the theoretical framework and though
leader review and demonstrate an example of how SaaS-metrics for earnouts can be de-
cided in a real situation. Firstly, the quantitative data of the case company is analysed,
and metrics are calculated. Through an iterative process with the case company, the data
is "cleaned" and analysed to make sure that the metrics accurately reflect the reality.
Thereafter, a group of KPIs are suggested to be used in a hypothetical earnouts. The best
practices and findings from the literature review and the thought leader review will serve
as a basis for how and why metrics are chosen.
2.3.4 Choice of case study company
When choosing a SaaS-business to use as a case unit, there are several things to consider.
First, the company’s main product must use a SaaS-model. Furthermore, the company
must have sufficient number of customers to have enough data to develop accurate metrics.
Here the annual contract value (ACV) is a key component since smaller ACV means
higher volume given the same monthly recurring revenue. When the company has reached
a significant volume of customers they can start becoming data-driven and work with
metrics and dashboards. An example is appropriate here: Two companies both have
monthly recurring revenues of $100k. Company A have 10000 customers with an average
revenue per customer of $10, company B have 10 customers with an average revenue per
customer of $10 000. If company A lose 1000 of their customers the first month, it is
possible to draw the conclusion that around 10% of the customers leave the first month. If
however one customer left for company B, one wouldn’t draw the conclusion that 10% of
the customers generally leave the first month since there is no statistical significance in the
data. Company A can develop sophisticated models for retention rate prediction and try
to find insights from segmenting users into cohort analysis to compare them. They need to
track metrics such as numbers of users since it cannot possible keep track of it manually.
Company B on the other hand can easily keep track of their customers and have a constant
dialogue with them. Both companies ar of the same size but work fundamentally different
with metrics.
The company chose for the case study is GetAccept AB, a sales engagement product with
a SaaS-delivery model. The company went through the Y-combinator accelerator in 2016
and has since then had presence both in Sweden and in Silicon Valley. It is a fast-growing
company backed by venture capital with more than 3000 users which makes it a suitable
company for this case study. The data presented from GetAccept AB will be indexed
and is not the actual data from the company itself since that is private and sensitive
information.
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2.4 Data collection
A qualitative approach is used for this study though quantitative data is used to calculate
the metrics in the case study. The thought leader review gathers qualitative data through
interviews, observations and documents. The author took notes during the interviews
and structured the notes by topics and keywords. Thereafter, the case study gathers
quantitative data to develop and calculate the appropriate metrics for the company from
which an earnout can be constructed.
2.4.1 Semi-structured interviews
An in-depth interview is a data-collection method involving one person interviewing the
participant and by this interaction letting the participant thoroughly discuss a certain
matter [18]. Interviews can be either semi-structured or structured. A structured interview
aims to script the eact formulation of the participant. A semi-structured interview is a less
strict form with a less strict interview guide [4]. Semi-structured interviews were deemed
appropriate due to the flexible nature and the ability for the participants to focus on the
area he or she believe is important.
2.4.2 Case study data
The gathered data for the case study is of both qualitative and quantitative nature. The
quantitative data is gathered to be able to calculate the appropriate metrics from which
earnout metrics can be chosen. The primary sources of this data are the CRM-system
(Hubspot), the invoicing system (ChargeBe) and the product GetAccept. The data from
Hubspot and Chargebe is sliced in the tool and then downloaded as a CSV file so that it is
possible to analyse it with Microsoft Excel. A "view" is created and saved in Hubspot so
that the correct data can easily be exported from the system when necessary. Hubspot data
concerns all data related do sales such as added MRR and users. ChargeBe data is used to
track cancelled and non-renewed subscriptions. GetAccept product data is used to track
engagement metrics and user behaviour within the product. The data from GetAccept
was gathered through SQL-queries and then downloaded as a CSV-file. Furthermore,
qualitative data is gathered through semi-structured interviews with GetAccept’s CEO
Samir Sjamic. The interviews are mostly used to understand the business model good
enough to ensure that the right metrics are being tracked and that they are tracked
the wrong way. Several interviews were conducted alongside the data analysis to better
understand the data.
2.5 Data analysis
Data analysis is about processing data and transforming it into something insightful [12].
Data analyses has mostly been done in parallel with data gathering for the thought leader
review to create structure.
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2.5.1 Interviews
A literature review is conducted along with a thought leader review to build the theoret-
ical framework on which the thesis builds upon. To complement it, six interviews were
conducted. The analysis of qualitative data should be an evolving process in which the
data collection and data analysis phases occur alongside each other [14]. Two techniques
that were used are pattern matching and explanation building [22]. The pre-recorded in-
terviews were transcribed in a semi-structured way to be able to categorise topics and tag
questions. Transcribing interviews facilitate analysis and pattern recognition. After the
interviews were conducted and the data gathered, the notes were analysed to find com-
monalities and insightful comments. All audio recordings were categorised into intervals
where different topics and questions were discussed. Keywords were highlighted, and notes
were taken when similar questions and insights were repeated by more than one person.
The essays that were analysed were also categorised into different topics. The data was
then compared to the existing theoretical framework to see how well it matched.
2.5.2 Case study data analysis
After data was gathered and exported to CSV-files, the data was analysed in Microsoft
Excel to clean up the data and calculate the appropriate metrics. The first step in the data
analysis was to create a key between Hubspot and ChargeBe to be able to connect the
data between the two tables. This was done through several matching algorithms based
on contact information, email address, name and postal code. A key called customer-ID
was then created in the Hubspot table to be able to match CRM data with invoice data.
After the key was created, significant time was spent cleaning the data through a series
of tests. Significant time was spent "cleaning" the data to make sure that no errors occur
and that the data accurately reflect the reality of the business. An example of a "data
cleaning technique" is to check if the number of users for each account is the same in the
CRM system as in the invoicing system. After the data cleaning process, the analyses and
calculation of appropriate metrics was done.
2.6 Trustworthiness
Trustworthiness is the degree of trust in the collected data, its interpretation and the
methods used ensure the quality of the study. The trustworthiness of this study is mea-
sured along four dimensions: Validity, transferability, objectivity and reliability [21]. The
validity of a study refers to how well the gathered data can respond and answer the ini-
tial research question, i.e. how well the study analyses what it is supposed to analyse
[7]. Transferability refers to the generalisation of the study, how well the conclusions are
applicable in the general case [11]. The objectivity of the study means to what extent the
authors own judgement, personal opinions and values have influenced the research results
[veatenteori]. Reliability is how likely it is that the result will be repeated if the research
is done a second time or by another researcher. These four dimensions are important
aspects for the general trustworthiness and credibility of the study and will be analysed
on their own below.
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2.6.1 Validity
The study’s validity refers to how well it answers the original research question. Generally,
the validity in a case study is regarded to be high [21]. The author ensures high validity
in the study by categorising data, creating interview guides and thoroughly iterating back
to the original research questions. Proper data collection methods were used throughout
the process to ensure high validity. An abductive research approach is used to make sure
further increase the validity in the study. The validity of this can be considered high as
the original research questions are answered properly.
2.6.2 Transferability
Transferability is about to what extent the results can be transferred to other context
outside this case study. It is about the generalisation of the conclusions how it can be
applied to other cases. When choosing a case study as a methodology there is generally
a risk of low transferability [22]. This study has concrete delimitations within which
earnouts and the metrics are somewhat similar. As previously discussed there are many
aspects that decide what types of metrics are most applicable such as annual contract value
(ACV). The type of milestones set in an earnout also depends on who the acquirer is and
the specific acquisitions strategy, which limits the transferability. However, the general
framework for deciding metrics in an earnout and the types of metrics that can be used
in an earnout for a SaaS-business are applicable to many SaaS-businesses of the same size
and ACV. The type of metrics is similar and the process for constructing the earnout is
applicable to other SaaS-businesses within the stated delimitations. Hence, this study can
be regarded as somewhat transferable to other SaaS-businesses post seed-funding, with
MRR>$50k and with more than 1000 customers.
2.6.3 Objectivity
Objectivity refers to the extent to which the authors own judgement and values have
influenced the result of the study. For qualitative research methods, the researchers have an
important role in interpretation, pattern recognition and synthesis of the collected research
[4]. Hence, the researcher’s own judgement has an important role to play in drawing
conclusions about qualitative information. Therefore, the objectivity of the content review
is relatively low. The objectivity of the quantitative part of the case study however can be
considered to be high as the author’s own judgement hasn’t influenced the calculations of
the metrics. Generally, the objectivity is in the study is fairly low due to the qualitative
research method and the data collection methodology.
2.6.4 Reliability
The study’s reliability refers to whether the same results would appear if the study was
conducted again [11]. For quantitative data, it signifies how reliable the data gathering
process is considering random variations. To ensure reliability in the content review and
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literature review, interviews have been transcribed and categorised. Generally, however,
the reliability is low if the primary data gathering method is interviews and observations.
Since the thought leader review is largely based in pre-recorded interviews, the reliability
can be considered low. The quantitative data used in the case study to develop the
metrics have high reliability since the data was properly cleaned and black-box tested
after analysis. The reliability on the calculated metrics is high, but the reliability on the
framework for choosing metrics in an earnout is lower because it is built on more unreliable
data such as observations and interviews.

Chapter 3
Theory
This chapter presents the theoretical framework on which the empirical data and analysis
build upon. It aims to give the reader the necessary theoretical building blocks on which
the argumentation and conclusions are based in the later chapters.
3.1 Traditional earnout metrics
The majority of earnouts use financial metrics as earnut metrics but some earnouts use
non-financial metrics such as product launch or FDA-approval. [23]. Typically, the seller
of the business wants to use revenue as metric while the buyers want to use net income
[10]. To overcome this, many earnouts use some kind of metric in the middle such as
EBIT or EBIDTA [23]. Other earnouts use metrics such as achievement on sales quota
or gross margin. AA 2017 study conducted by SRS Acquiom shows that 64% of deals use
revenue, 24% of deals use EBIDTA or earnings as earnout metric, and 36% oif deals use
some other kind of earnout metric [55]. The most common financial metrics for earnouts
are explained below:
• Revenue is the amount of money that a company actually receives during a specific
period, including discounts and deductions for returned merchandise. Revenue is
also known as sales or "top line"[51]
• EBIT (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes) is a financial metric calculated as rev-
enue minus expenses, excluding interest payments and taxes. However, there are
many different ways to calculate EBIT and it is not a GAAP-metric. EBIT is also
referred to as Operating Earnings and Operating Profit. The metric measures the
profit a company generates from its operations, ignoring variables such as capital
structure and tax burden. The metric is useful when a firm is considering buying
another firm out since the existing capital structure matters less than the company’s
earning potential.[47]
• EBIDTA (Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization) is a
financial metric calculated as net profit + Interest +Taxes + Depreciation + Amor-
tization. Though often shown on an income statement, it is not considered part of
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the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) by the SEC. EBITDA is of-
ten used in valuation ratios and compared to enterprise value and revenue. EBITDA
is now commonly quoted by many companies, especially in the tech sector. EBIDTA
is an indicator of the company’s financial performance without taking into account
the capital structure as well as financing and accounting decisions. [48]
• Gross margin is a company’s total revenue minus the cost of goods sold (COGS),
divided by total sales revenue. It is a measure of profitability, expressed as a percent-
age and represents the portion of revenue that the company retains as gross profit.
[49]
• Net income is a company’s total earnings, also called profit. Net Income is calcu-
lated as revenue minus all costs of doing business such as operating expenses, taxes,
depreciation and amortization. [50]
3.2 Lean Analytics
Lean Analytics looks at how startups should use data to build better and faster. It focuses
around how to use analytics to measure success in experiments, power decision making
and fundamentally understand the business and its customers. Instincts are experiments,
data is proof. Much of lean analytics is about finding meaningful metrics, then running
experiments to improve it until that metric is good enough for you to move on to the next
problem or stage[16].
3.2.1 Building Blocks
Lean startup is an extension of Lean Startup and heavily influenced by Customer Devel-
opment[16].
Customer Development, developed by professor Steve Blank, is a framework for discovering
and validating the right market for the right idea. The concept centres around building
the right features that solve a customer’s needs, testing the model and tactic for acquiring
customers, and developing the right organisation to scale the business. The concept takes
a direct aim at the outdated "build it and they will come" approach with linear waterfall
development of products and companies. Customer Development focuses on an iterative
process with continuous collecting of feedback that will impact the product’s and business’
direction.[9]
Lean startup was developed by Eric Ries, combining customer development, agile develop-
ment methodologies and lean manufacturing. One of Lean Startup’s core concepts is the
build-measure-learn loop, where the ultimate goal is to maximise learning. Lean Startup
tries to reduce waste and strongly advocate for test-driven development, identification of
assumptions, cross-functional collaboration and an experimental approach. Lean Startup
is also the origin of expressions such as MVP, pivot, validated learning and innovation
accounting. [20]
Lean Analytics focus on the measure part of the build-measure-learn loop [24].
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3.2.2 The Right Metric for the Right Stage
The stage of the business influences the type of core metrics that entrepreneurs and man-
agement teams should focus on. Croll and Yoskovitz (2011) suggest five stages: Empathy,
stickiness, virality, revenue and scale [16].
In the empathy stage the entrepreneurs need to understand whether they are working
on a problem worth solving, a real problem that the target market care about. This means
getting out of the building and conducting interviews, observations and surveys[9]. The
metrics for this stage are exploratory and usually qualitative[16].
In the stickiness stage entrepreneurs need to find out if they can build a solution to the
discovered problem. Pre-mature scaling is detrimental to the business, so the focus on
this stage should be to improve engagement and stickiness. The key metrics here are user
retention rate, weekly time spent by users, users’ average time since last visit and other
engagement-metrics that are relevant to the specific business and product. The MVP is
then iterated to understand how users are interacting with the product.[20]
In the virality stage the company should focus on experimenting with virality. A famous
example of this is when Hotmail added a link for people who received e-mails from Hotmail
to sign up for the service. The product was tweaked to increase the inherent virality in the
product which became a huge force multiplier in their growth. The most important metrics
in this stage are the viral coefficient and the viral cycle time. However, these metrics are
mostly used for experiments and tests rather than reporting due to the practical difficulties
calculating an exact number. In the virality stage the company should also start attacking
the leading indicators of growth and experimenting with growth hacking [16].
In the revenue stage the company has moved beyond stickiness and virality, and start
focusing on revenue. If the stickiness and virality stages are done right, they will compound
and fuel the paid growth. The goal of the revenue stage is to prove that money can
be made in a capital-efficient, scalable, sustainable and consistent way. The focus now
shifts from building a product to building a business. Hence, the core metrics shift from
measuring usage patterns to measuring business ratios. The paid engine of growth become
the primary focus and thus the OMTM is shifted toward CAC:LTV and magic number
which measure capital-efficiency and drive growth. [16]
In the scale stage revenues are coming in and focus shifts from growing the business
to growing the market. More customers need to be acquired from new verticals and
geographies. Investments are being made into channels, partners and distribution to
grow the user base. Interaction with users is less important since they are now analysed
quantitatively. Metrics such as CAC payback time are measured across channels, regions
and marketing campaigns to find the most effective customer acquisition strategy. Costs
become more important and as the organisation grow there will be many more functional
departments who have their own metrics and reports. Metrics should also focus on the
health of the entire ecosystem and the ability to enter new markets. The number of
important metrics increase as the strategy and organisation become more complex. [16]
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3.2.3 What makes a good metric?
Lean Analytics set out some general heuristics of what makes a good metric. In the age
of information, data overflow is a big obstacle and knowing what to measure and how to
interpret the results is critical to making metrics actionable and gaining the value from
them.’
A metric should be (1) comparative, (2) understandable, (3) behaviour changing
and (4) a ratio or a rate [16].
A metric should be comparative. In order to understand in which direction the trend
is moving, it is important to be able to compare a metric to other time periods, types of
users, competitor and cohorts. The key to making data actionable is by segmenting and
comparing which is why a good metric always is comparable. [16]
A metric should be understandable.If people can’t interpret or understand a metrics
it is not actionable. It is very difficult to create a data-driven culture if people don’t use
metrics that are easy to understand. Using analytics to inform decisions will be hard if
they are not easy to interpret.[16]
A metric should be behaviour changing. The metric should inform decisions and
the way people in the organisation act. The most important question when deciding
upon a metric is: What will you do differently based on changes in a metric? Metrics
can be "accounting metrics" or "experimental metrics". Accounting metrics are typical
metrics such as sales volume, whereas experimental metrics are how the results of tests
are measured. Experimental metrics are by nature more likely to change behaviour.[16]
A metric should be a ratio or a rate. Ratios are generally easier to act on than
metrics in absolute numbers. A ratio is inherently comparative and show the general
trend. Furthermore, rations are good for comparing factors that are somehow opposed or
for which there’s an inherent tension, such as in cost-benefit analyses. [16]
3.2.4 Lagging and leading indicators
Metrics can be either leading or lagging indicators. A leading indicator tries to predict the
future, whereas a lagging indicator is reporting on past performance. Another distinction
is that leading indicators are generally input-oriented while lagging indicators are output-
oriented. An example of leading and lagging indicators of weight-loss: A good lagging
indicator would be "kg of weight lost this quarter" and a leading indicator could be
"calorie deficit per day". In SaaS, a leading indicator is lead velocity rate (the rate at
which the number of qualified leads are increasing) while a lagging indicator would be
churn rate (number of customers who leave a given time period). For leading indicators to
work as a prediction of lagging indicators, a startup need more data so they can conduct
cohort-analysis in order to compare segments and groups of users. Therefore, startups in
the earlier stages should focus on lagging indicators until they can thoroughly understand
the causality between leading and lagging indicators. [16]
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3.2.5 Vanity Metrics
Vanity metrics generally refer to metrics that strike your ego but cannot be acted upon
[20]. If you are measuring a piece of data that doesn’t help guiding actions or decisions,
it’s a vanity metric. Managers should always ask themselves: "What will I to differently
based on the information i receive from the metric". A vanity metric typically goes "up
to the right" in a graph and feels good to present. A good example is the "total number
of signups" for a SaaS product or mobile application. The number will always increase
but doesn’t say anything valuable about whether the users are valuable or not. They may
have signed up and then left forever. "Total active users" would be a better metric but is
still a vanity metric as it will gradually increase over time. The actionable metric would
be "percentage of users who are active", as it tells us something of the level of engagement
between the users and the product [20].
3.2.6 Cohort Analysis
Cohort analysis is a type of analysis that compare segments of users over time [3]. It
is used to understand and predict how users will act and can be used as both a leading
and a lagging indicator depending on the type of metrics that are being tracked. As the
product progresses and the company is formed, users will have a different experience with
the product over time. Cohort analyses can analyse and measure the effect of new user
on-boarding schemes, feature development and other product iterations [57]. For instance,
it can be used as an exploratory metric of how users responded to 30 days trial period
instead of 14. It can also be used to measure how retention and churn has improved over
time. Cohort analysis is a multifaceted tool that is used to segment and compare groups
of users for various reasons [45]. It can be done for revenue, engagement, churn, virality,
costs or any other type of metric that matter [16].
The example below demonstrates an example of cohort-analysis is commonly done for
subscription services. The users of the subscription service are divided into six different
cohorts (groups or segments) depending on what month they signed up and became cus-
tomers. The groups of users are here represented by the six different rows in the table.
The columns are the number of months after sign-up date and the values are the gross
retention rate. Gross retention rate is defined as the percentage of users in the cohort that
are still customers. In this cohort analysis 400 users signed up in Jan-17 and five months
later only 58% of those, a total of 232, users are still customers.
Figure 3.1: Cohort analysis example: Gross retention rate for fictive subscription service
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The table is usually viewed both horizontally and vertically. Looking at each cohort’s
retention over time shows which months users tend to leave the product. Looking hori-
zontally over one column will tell how the company has progressed its gross retention rate
over time [57]. One can for example compare the "three-month retention rate" between
cohorts to see if efforts to improve it has yielded results. A cohort analysis can also be
plotted out as a graph:
Figure 3.2: Plotted cohort analysis example: Gross retention rate for fictive subscription
service
From this chart we can see that users tend to drop out the third month that they use the
product. We can also see that the company has improved its user retention over time.
Cohort analysis is a very insightful tool that can be used to compare segments of users
with various metrics.
3.2.7 The three engines of growth
The three engines of growth is a concept originally developed in The Lean Startup by Eric
Ries [20]. The three engines are the sticky engine, the viral engine and the paid
engine. Each engine has their associated metrics. The concept should not be viewed
as a choice between the three, but rather three different engines that together drive the
companies to scale.
The sticky engine focus on retaining customers for the long run, and to make them keep
using the product. If the product isn’t sticky, many customers will stop using the product
and the churn will be high. Many companies try to create "barriers to exit" for users so it
is difficult for them to stop using the product or delete their account. Engagement is the
best leading indicator of success with the sticky engine. The fundamental metrics for the
sticky engine is customer retention and churn. Importantly though, stickiness isn’t only
about customer retention but also about the frequency of use [16].
The viral engine is about word of mouth or a product that advertise itself. Virality
is very attractive as it compounds the user base and is a very cheap source of growth.
There are three types of virality: Inherent virality, artificial virality and word-of-mouth
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virality[20].
• Inherent virality is a natural form of virality build into the product and happens
as a function of use. With inherent virality, the usage of the product itself is an
advertisement. A good example of this are food delivery services: whenever they
deliver food consumers may see the car with the name on and the use of the product
itself is an advertisement. Another example could be TripIt where you share your
travel plans with colleagues. [16]
• Artificial virality is virality that can be bought. The classic version of this is when
users get are incentivised to invite their friends though some kind of offering such
as Dropbox who give user more storage or AirBnB who give their users a promotion
code.
• Word-of-mouth virality is the natural type of virality where people who use the
service talk about it to their friends and colleagues. This type of virality is much
harder to track and measure.[16]
The key metric for the viral engine is the viral coefficient - the number of new users
that each user brings on. If the viral coefficient is greater than 1 the user base will
grow exponentially. Due to the compound effect of a high virality coefficient, this engine
can fuel exponential growth. Viral coefficient is a theoretical metric that is difficult to
track, in particularly for the word-of-mouth engine. However, it is very suitable to use as
an experimental metric for tests and experiments to improve artificial virality. Another
important metric in the viral engine of growth is the viral cycle time which is the speed
with which users invite each other[16].
The paid engine is where the company pay for its growth. The classic example is
through paid advertising such as super bowl ads, Google AdWords or outdoor ads. It is
usually premature to turn on this engine until the product is sticky enough and somewhat
viral. The effect of paid engine can be compounded if the product is sticky and viral[20].
The most important metric for the paid engine is the ratio between LTV:CAC (Customer
Life-time value and customer acquisition costs). This metric shows how much more the
customers are worth over their lifetime compared to the cost of acquiring them upfront
[57]. Revenue from the acquired customers can then be funnelled back into customer
acquisition. LTV is generally a tricky metric to calculate since it is based on several
assumptions such as future churn rate. Another important metric is CAC payback time
which measure the time it takes to recover the initial customer acquisition costs[16].
3.2.8 The one metric that matters
One of the keys to startup success is to achieve real focus. Focus, however, doesn’t mean
myopia. Focus in metrics simply means that at any given time there’s one metric to care
about above all else. Eri Ries argues in The Lean Startup that successful companies focus
on one of the three engines of growth at a time [20]. In analytics this means to focus on
one metric that matter (OMTM). The OMTM heavily depend on what stage the business
is in. At any given time, many metrics should be tracked and reported, but one should
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be the core focus. Capture everything, focus on what’s important and remember that the
OMTM change over time [16].
3.3 SaaS Metrics
3.3.1 Financial metrics
3.3.1.1 Monthly Recurring Revenue (MRR)
Monthly recurring revenue (MRR) is the most commonly used financial metric for SaaS-
businesses. The SaaS-model is based on recurring revenue: once you have acquired a
customer you have recurring revenue from the subscription until the subscription is can-
celled and churn occurs. MRR is simply the revenue that the company gets ever month
from its subscriptions. If the subscription doesn’t pay on a monthly basis, the revenue is
normalised into a monthly amount [16]. Sometimes Annual Reccuring Revenue (ARR) is
measured instead, which simply is the same as MRR but annualised.
3.3.1.2 Annual Contract Value (ACV)
Annual Contract Value is the annualised value (ARR) that each customer brings in. The
ACV of a SaaS-business heavily influence the type of sales processes that should be used
and the metrics that should be tracked. High ACV imply bigger contracts which typi-
cally requires more personal selling, help from sales engineers, customisation and more
integrations. SaaS-businesses that sell subscriptions with small ACV tend to have a lot of
customers. Higher volume of customers leads to more data which means that it is possible
to develop sophisticated metrics at an earlier stage as significance is quickly reached [16].
When the ACV is high, the data collection tends to be more qualitative. Therefore, the
target ACV of the subscriptions influence the types of metrics that matter.[46]
3.3.1.3 ARPU and ARPA
Average Revenue Per User (ARPU) and Average Revenue Per Account(ARPA) are defined
as the average revenue that each user/account brings in a particular month. The simple
way of calculating ARPU is:
ARPU =
Total MRR
Number of users
(3.1)
ARPA =
Total MRR
Number of accounts
(3.2)
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3.3.2 Churn
For subscription models, churn means users that cancel or don’t renew their subscriptions
[60]. Churn also include downgrades, existing customers who are still paying but have
churned some of their previous MRR. Simply put, customers that stop paying the recurring
revenue they were previously paying. Churn can be measured in MRR, users or accounts
where monthly MRR churn rate typically is the most commonly used metric. Churn is
a key metric for SaaS-businesses as it is in direct opposition to growth. It has a direct
impact on profitability, customer lifetime value and the company’s valuation. If the churn
is high it generally means that customers don’t think the product is worth paying for.
Churn is an essential part of the SaaS-model and managers spend an incredible amount
of time watching the metric. [16]
3.3.2.1 Simple churn: monthly MRR churn rate
Simple churn is a metric that is often simply referred to as "churn rate". It is the amount
of MRR, users or accounts that churn a specific month divided by the total number in the
beginning of the month.
MRR churn rate =
Total MRR churned this month
Total MRR in the beginning of this month
(3.3)
There are several problems with simple churn. For instance, it does not consider whether
the user can churn or not and the metric get skewed in high growth[60]. The problem
with the metric is that the numerator stems from users in the past and the denominator
from current users. An example properly illustrates the problem with simple churn during
high growth: A hypothetical SaaS-company has 100 users in January and grows to 10000
users the first of May. During May, all the 100 users from January churn. The simple
churn rate here would be 1% which can be considered low. The churn rate is only at 1%
but in fact all of the users from January have churned five months later which is a very
short customer lifetime and a very high actual churn rate. This problem is best solved
with cohort analyses[3].
3.3.2.2 Net MRR churn rate
Net MRR churn rate is the calculated as the net loss of MRR month over month after
factoring in revenue increase from existing customers [57]. Most SaaS-businesses price
their product along at least one variable pricing axis to facilitate up-sell. Examples of
this are Dropbox who price on data storage and GetAccept who price on number of users
within the company. Several SaaS-businesses use a pricing model with several tiers with
different feature set. Net churn is calculated as the percentage of MRR that is churned
subtracted by added MRR from up-sell and up-grades [44].
Net churn =
(Churned MRR− Increased MRR from existing customers)
Total MRR at the start of the month
(3.4)
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Net MRR churn rate can be negative, which is known as Net Negative Churn [60]. This
happens when up-sell on the existing customer base is larger than the churn. Net Negative
Churn is by entrepreneurs and venture capitalists known as "the holy grail" and most
management teams strive to reach it. Net negative churn is like high yield saving accounts:
every month more money comes in without much effort from the company [53]. The effect
is very positive and can fuel a SaaS-business growth to huge success. To illustrate the
power of net negative churn, we can compare two hypothetical SaaS-companies. Both
companies acquire 100 users per month over a period of 12 months, each paying $1 per
month. Company A have a churn rate of 5% per month and company B have a net
negative churn of -5%. Company A will have 919 users with an MRR of $919 in the end
of the year, while company B will have 1592 users and an MRR of $1592 by the end of
the year. Below are the plots of the user growth for both companies.[16]
Figure 3.3: SaaS-company A: Annual user growth with 5% monthly churn rate
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Figure 3.4: SaaS-company B: Annual user growth with -5% Net Negative Churn rate
In both cases the two companies acquire the same amount of users month over month but
the difference in growth rate is staggering. This example clearly demonstrates the power
of net negative and how it fuels growth over time [57]. Another benefit of net negative
churn is that up-sell generally is less expensive than customer acquisition.
3.3.2.3 Available churn
In many cases subscriptions can be purchased on different time periods such as monthly,
quarterly and annual. This means that not all customers can churn every month which
makes the simple churn rate inaccurate [60]. Consider an example where 90% of a hypo-
thetical SaaS-business’ customers are on annual contract and 10% are on monthly con-
tracts. The company have a churn rate of 5%. Let’s say that the company was started
11 months ago so that no customers on annual contracts can churn yet. This means that
50% of the customers that can churn do so every month and it is likely that the customers
who are on annual contracts will churn as soon as their contract period is over. Available
churn takes into account the number of customers that can churn every specific month,
i.e. the customers that are not tied up in longer subscriptions.[59]
Available churn =
Churned MRR
Total MRR from customers who can churn this month
(3.5)
3.3.2.4 Retention cohort
Retention cohort is a good way of measuring and analysing the user churn rate of a SaaS-
product. Cohort analysis is used to be able to compare segments of users as well as trends
30 Chapter 3. Theory
in the churn rate plotted over time [3]. The retention cohort shows when users tend to
churn and also how the churn rate has changed over time. A retention cohort can be
calculated either as net or gross retention and on MRR, account or user basis. [57]
Net MRR Retentionxy =
TI− C
T
(3.6)
T = Total initial MRR from customers in cohort x
I = Increased MRR in month y from customers in cohort x
C= Churned MRR in month y from customers in cohort x
3.3.3 Engagement metrics
Measuring engagement in the product is key to understand how sticky the product is and
whether or not it is ready to scale [16]. The ultimate metric for engagement is daily use,
the percentage of customers that use the product on a daily basis. Some products, such as
a tax preparation site or a reservation tool for dentists, simply are not meant to be used
on a daily basis. For most SaaS-products engagement is a very strong leading indicator
of churn [3]. If the engagement early on in the customer journey is low, it will be hard
to demonstrate enough value to avoid churn. Engagement is the key metric for stickiness
which fuel the sticky engine of growth. It is an indicator that the company is building a
product that the users want. Engagement metrics are also very suitable for experiments
through looking at usage patterns [56]. Various engagement metrics can also be calculated
on a cohort basis and compared to a retention cohort to see how engagement compares
and correlate with churn. From this data the company can then draw conclusions on
when to take actions to try to re-engage their users to avoid churn. If, for example,
the cohort analysis shows that users engagement drops in month three and the churn in
month four and five is high, the conclusion can be drawn that more resources should be
put on activating users in month three [engagementscore]. The company can then act
on this insight with their customer success team and trying different on-boarding schemes.
Another effective way of using engagement metrics is to identify users in trials who are
ready to purchase. It can also be used to identify prospects for upsell [56].
3.3.3.1 DAU, WAU and MAU
The most commonly used metric for measuring engagement are numbers of daily, weekly
and monthly active users [16]. To fulfil the criteria that a good metric should be a ratio,
this is usually compared to the total number of users of the product [3]. Some products
are supposed to only be used every month while some products should ultimately track
daily usage. Therefore, the products use case and value add need to be considered before
choosing between DAU, WAU and MAU. The company also need to define what they
consider to be an active user. For some products this is simply logging in while for others
it is taking a specific action such as writing, sharing, uploading or sending [16]. If the
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company is only using logins as the measure of activeness they might miss out on useful
insights into what types of features the users are using [56].
3.3.3.2 Engagement scores
The customer engagement score is a single metric that measure how engaged the customers
are [56]. The higher the number the more engaged they are. A customer engagement
metric set a weight to the different actions a user can do within the product based on how
important they are for the company. The formula then calculates a metric based on both
user frequency and engagement weight of the features used and actions taken to a single
metric showing the overall engagement of the user. Customer engagement score can help
finding customers in trial who are ready to purchase, identify customers who are about
to churn or need help, and identify customers who are appropriate for up-sell or cross-sell
[16]. Customer engagement score is an excellent experimental metric to understand how
to make the product stickier and the user more engaged. It is a metric that should be
closely watched at the stickiness stage. [engagementscore]
3.3.4 Customer Acquisition and Sales Efficiency Metrics
Customer acquisition and sales efficiency metrics measure the unit economics of a subscription-
based business model [16]. As previously discussed, the SaaS-model is based on acquiring
customers upfront and then getting payed back over time [57]. This delay cash-flow and
means that traditional way of viewing revenue, costs and margins must be changed to ac-
curately reflect the unit economics of the business. Sales efficiency metrics provides a good
way of understanding how effective the company’s customer acquisition is and whether it
is ready to scale and invest in growth [58]. Venture capitalists tend to view sales efficiency
metrics as crucial as it is a measure of how capital efficient startups will be with their
investments [53].
3.3.4.1 LTV:CAC
Customer acquisition costs (CAC) are the total combined costs associated with acquiring
a customer [16]. The customer Lifetime Value (LTV) is the total value of a customer
over its lifetime. The ration between customer lifetime value and customer acquisition
costs (LTV:CAC) is the metrics that is most often cited by venture capitalists as the most
important metric they look at when investing in SaaS [57]. Simply put, it measures how
much money is spend acquiring customers compared to their worth from cradle to grave.
The problem with this metrics is that the LTV calculation is based on assumptions on
future churn. If the product has net negative churn the theoretical LTV would be infinite
which of course is incorrect [3]. In practice, a maximum lifespan of 1-4 years is often
used to cap the lifetime value customer if the churn is low or negative. A general rule of
thumb is that LTV should be three times higher than CAC for it to be capital efficient
enough to start investing in the paid engine of growth [3]. If the metric is below three the
company need to focus on stickiness and virality to boost sales efficiency before trying the
paid engine again [16]. The LTV:LTV also is difficult to get correct in practice as it is
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unclear how to divide salaries in the CAC if for instance some people are doing both sales
and product work [60]. It is also a metric that vary a lot month-to-month. LTV:CAC is
theoretically one of the most important metrics as it shows whether or not the business
model is viable. In practice, however, it is a difficult metric to use as it builds on several
assumption. Customer Lifetime Value (LTV) is calculated from the churn rate:
LTV =
ARPU
Churn rate
(3.7)
3.3.4.2 Magic number
The magic number is an easy metric that measure the output of a year’s worth of MRR
growth compared for every dollar spent on sales and marketing [58]. The magic number
is calculated from the increase in annualised MRR between two quarters, compared to
the customer acquisition costs spend in previous quarter [16]. It is a simpler metric than
LTV:CAC that is easier to measure as it doesn’t build on several assumptions inherent to
the LTV.
Magic Number Qx =
(MRR (Qx)−MRR (Qx−1)) ∗ 12
CACx−1
(3.8)
If the metric is below 0.75 the company is not ready to scale as it first must improve its
capital efficiency. A good benchmark for a SaaS-business is to be above 1 when it starts
scaling and investing in the paid engine of growth.
3.3.4.3 CAC payback period
CAC payback period measures the time it takes to recover the customer acquisition costs
from subscriptions [16]. Even if the unit economics looks viable and the LTV:CAC ratio is
above 1/3, there might be issues with cashflow for the company [58]. This is particularly
common when the company has long customer lifetime as it might take a long time to
recover the cash spend upfront for acquire customers. CAC payback period is important
as it determines how much cash the company will need to grow [53].
CAC payback period =
CAC
MRR - (Average cost of service)
(3.9)
3.4 Earnouts
The earnout provision is often used in private M&A and particularly in the technology and
the life science industries. The reason for using earnouts is usually because the seller and
the buyer have very different views on value and financial projections [42]. The purpose is
to share and balance risk and return between the acquirer and the acquiree of a business
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venture. Studies have shown that earnout financing contributes to the achievement of
many objectives and benefit both parties in the acquisition [29]. Barbopoulos and Adra
(2016) argue that the sellers are compensated for sharing the post-acquisition integration
risk by being offered a relatively higher risk-premia[29]. .
An earnout will never be constructed in a perfect way, but it can be fair and balanced for
both parties. It is a complex provision that need careful consideration to ensure that both
parties benefit from it. A poorly structured deal can lead to opportunistic behaviour from
the acquirer where they can impact the possibility for the seller to reach the objectives
and get the additional payment from the earnout[25].
Danielle Myles (2005) argue that there are four main stages that define the earnout deal:
Partner selection, value determination, structure identification and pay-out schedule[10].
Partner selection is about the identification of the right transaction partner, committing
on the ultimate success of the merger, aligning on acquisition strategy, conduct proper due
diligence and examination of prior transactions. If the acquirer previously has done deals
with earnout provisions, the acquirer should diligently investigate whether the projected
earnout target milestones were met or not. Value determination is simply the negotiation
of the value that is attributed to the transaction. The structure identification goes through
the details of the payments such as whether they are to be paid in cash or equity. In the
pay-out schedule, the milestones and earn-out length are decided [10].
The earnout clause has five key components: the metric by which performance is measured,
the amount, the calculation mechanism, accounting measures and seller protections post-
closing[28][25].
3.4.1 The earnout metric
There are many ways to structure the metric by which performance is measured in an
earnout [23]. The buyer usually wants to base the earn-out on the seller’s standalone
profitability. The seller, however, usually want the earnout to be based on revenue. Using
revenue as the metric creates a problem in that the seller can spend an enormous amount
of money on achieving the revenue milestone and neglect the profitability. Using profit,
however, also creates a problem as it is possible to move costs within the company via
"creative accounting" [42]. Many deals use EBIDTA or EBIT as a middle ground to satisfy
both seller and buyer. Some deals have used non-financial metrics such as product launch
or obtaining FDA drug approval for a drug or medical device. An earnout milestone can
also be track performance on the entire entity, a business-unit, or a particular product or
set of products [25].A recent survey of life science deals showed successful achievement of
milestones in more than 50% of cases [25]
3.4.2 The amount
Deciding upon how much of the value should be tied to earnout payments vs upfront pay-
ment is a critical part of the earnout structure. The more money that is payed upfront,
the more the risk shifts to the acquirer. It is also an indication of how much the acquirer
value the seller’s technology. Upfront payments account for more than half of the total
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value in more than two-thirds of transactions [23]. In life science deals, earnout payments
are typically a larger proportion of the total value compared to other industries [41]. Ven-
ture capitalists usually don’t prefer a large part of the total transaction value in earnouts
as it increases the time to liquidity. In most transactions the up-front payment is about
30-70% of the total transaction value. Typically, more proven technologies tend to have a
larger part of the transaction in up-front payments [10].
3.4.3 The calculation mechanism
The calculation mechanism defines under what conditions earnout payments should be
payed such as thresholds, caps and tiers. A threshold is the minimum performance that
needs to be achieved to receive earnout payments. If an earnout is capped, there is a
maximum amount that can be received if all milestones are reached. A multiple tier
structure typically includes multiple performance targets with different earnout payment
rates tied to each level of performance. An earnout calculation mechanism can be based
on a percentage of performance or as a fixed amount if a certain milestone is achieved [41].
Sellers will typically seek pro-rated payments for performance below target rather than a
binary outcome. About 73% of earnouts use a cap on the earnout payment, 70% use a
minimum threshold, and 30& use a multiple tier structure [25].
All parties in the M&A process must also consider an appropriate length of the earnout.
A long earnout period increases the risk for the seller due to the chances of unforeseen
events happening that could hinder or prevent achievement of the milestones [25]. The
American Bar Association found that 38% of deals had an earnout period of one year or
less, 18% had a period between one and two years, 12% had a period between two and
three years, and 12% had period between three and four years[25]. High-tech industries
tend to have shorter earnout periods while life science tends to have longer[41].
The capitalisation structure of the seller should be considered when designing an earnout
structure. If the company is funded by a venture capital fund at the end of the fund’s life
cycle, it will impact the decision about earnout length as the fund need to return capital
to their limited partners [25].
3.4.4 Post-closing control and seller protection
One of the key problems that cause tension between buyers and sellers relying on earnout
provisions, relates back to the role of the acquirer once the deal is completed and their
responsibility regarding the performance of the assets after closing. The seller is vulner-
able to the buyer’s actions and decisions, which may impact the likelihood of reaching
milestones and receiving earnout payments. If the milestones aren’t met, and sellers are
deprived on expected pay-outs, the sellers can argue that the buyer didn’t do enough to
ensure the earnout was met [15]. Furthermore, it is also possible that the acquirer allocates
inadequate resources to sell the product and thus making it difficult for the seller to reach
the agreed milestones for additional payment. The earnout provision usually include good
faith and reasonable effort provisions to protect against opportunistic behaviour. Several
court cases have set precedent for what is perceived to be good faith and reasonable effort
and even when a good faith clause is not used the courts have ruled that such an obligation
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is implied. Generally, earnouts are easier to execute when buyers are dealing with a set of
assets that will remain independent post-closing [15]. A recent survey showed that more
than 60% of earnout deals used some kind of provision to restrict the buyer’s discretion
to operate the business [25].
3.4.5 Accounting measures
The precision in how metrics are calculated is important so that both sides are on the
same side when it comes to the definition. Accounting metrics should be specified, formu-
las should be constructed, and examples provided to clarify and eliminate confusion over
the math [15]. Depending on the duration of the earnout, the buyer may be incentivised
to manipulate the recognition of sales from one time-period to the other to avoid reaching
the milestones and having to pay additional the earnout value to the seller. Both parties
must agree upon accounting measures in the deal to avoid confusion, sub-optimisation
and litigation. The seller must also pay close attention to the definition of what is being
measured such as product, entity or business-unit. If the milestone is set for the perfor-
mance of a specific product the definition of what constitute that product must be clearly
defined and understood [25].
3.4.6 Dispute resolution and litigation
In theory, the earnout solves the initial disagreement over price and future projections
by requiring the buyer to pay more only if the business proves that it is worth more
[25]. However, since the value is frequently debatable and the causes of underperformance
equally so, an earnout often converts today’s disagreement over price into tomorrow’s legal
litigation over the outcome. Often, dispute resolution and litigation stems from lack of
clarity relating performance metrics or post-closing allocation of resources from the buyer.
Shell’s UK Head of Legal expressed his view of earnouts in Myles (2015): "I can absolutely
see the value in an earnout, and I can absolutely see the theoretical attractiveness of an
earnout as a way of bridging parties’ legal and commercial differences about the potential
valuations, but I am personally quite sceptical about using them as they are very tricky
to draft, and unless the seller and buyer are very clear and aligned on its purpose, it can
be an invitation to litigation" [28].
3.5 Synopsis
Traditionally, the metrics used in earnouts are financially metrics such as revenue, EBIT,
EBITDA or net income. This chapter goes through the definitions of those metrics, Lean
Analytics’ metrics and key concepts, as well as theory around the earnout provision.
Lean Analytics classify startups into five different stages: the empathy stage, the stickiness
stage, the virality stage, the revenue stage and the scale stage. The type of metric that
matters differs depending on what stage the company is in. Furthermore, it emphasises
the importance of reaching certain milestone before attempting to move on to the next
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stage.
There are four key categories of metrics that SaaS-businesses should track: financial met-
rics, churn, engagement metrics and sales efficiency metrics.
• Financial metrics include metrics such as Monthly Recurring Revenue (MRR),
Average Revenue per User or Account (ARPU and ARPA) and Annual Contract
Value (ACV). The key financial metric is monthly recurring revenue (MRR) which
is the revenue that the company gets every month from its subscriptions (one-time
fees are excluded).
• Churn metrics measure the rate at which customers stop subscribing to the prod-
uct. An appropriate analogy is that MRR can be seen as a bucket of subscriptions
and churn is the rate at which the bucket is leaking. Important metrics are the
Simple Churn Rate, the Available Churn Rate, Net MRR Churn Rate and Cohort
Analysis of Net MRR Retention Rate.
• Engagement metrics measure how much and how often the users are using the
product. It is a leading indicator of churn. The type of metric differs from com-
pany to company, but some commonly used metrics are: Daily/Weekly/Monthly
Active Users (DAU, WAU and MAU), Engagement Scores and Engagement Cohort
Analysis.
• Sales efficiency metrics measure the return on investment on sales and marketing
and give insights into how scalable the customer acquisition strategy is. Key metrics
is Customer Lifetime Value to Customer Acquisition Costs (LTV:CAC), The Magic
Number and CAC Payback Period.
These metrics can be used to understand what stage the company is in. If the engagement
metrics are low, the company is still in the stickiness stage. If there is yet no inherent
virality in the product, the company is in the virality stage. If the churn and the engage-
ment is high, the company is in the revenue stage. If the engagement is high, virality is
implemented, churn is low, and sales efficiency is favourable, then the company is ready
to scale.
Important aspects to consider when constructing an earnout are the earnout metric, the
amount, the calculation mechanism, post-closing control, accounting measures, and dis-
pute resolution and litigation. It is important that the earnout metric is aligned with the
acquisition strategy of the buyer so that the seller is trying to reach goals that matter for
the acquirer. The metric should be chosen so that it is difficult to manipulate through
"creative accounting" and cost allocation within the company. Many earnout lead to le-
gal litigation over the outcome which is why the calculation mechanism and accounting
measure should be clearly defined and understood by all parties involved. After the ac-
quisition, the seller is vulnerable to the buyer’s actions and decisions. The buyer can in
theory try to avoid having to pay additional earnout payments by stop selling the product
or allocating inadequate resources to it. Therefore, the earnout provision include good
faith provisions for reasonable effort from the seller.
Chapter 4
Empircs
In this chapter is divided into two parts. The first part presents the findings from the
interviews and the second chapter presents the data for the case study company that has
been analysed. The data and metrics that are presented in the latter part are from the
theoretical framework in previous chapter.
4.1 Interviews
The findings from interviews consist of both pre-recorded interviews as well as semi-
structured interviews with people with insights into the M&A for fast-growing technology
businesses in general and SaaS-companies in particular. The purpose is to complement
existing theory with insights into acquisitions strategies and the earnout provision. The
findings are divided into the sections "acquisition strategies" and "the earnout provision".
Deloitte’s Gerbert Hubert argue:
"Larger companies are looking at M&A as a tool to jump into a new market or
ramp up a new technology quickly. M&A can solve time-to-market issues and
talent issues far quicker than internal activities can."[54]
4.1.1 Acquisition strategies
Acquisitions in the software industry happens for many different reasons. The acquisition
strategy depends on the acquirer, where private equity firms will have radically different
strategies from larger technology incumbents. Though PE deals in early stage tech, M&A
from the large technology incumbents are still more common which is why the interviews
focus on them. The acquisition strategies are usually based on talent, technology, product,
market entry or financial interest.
Matt Switzer, SVP of Corporate Development at HootSuite, explains:
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"The way we look at and evaluate potential M&A, is that there are three main
sources of value in a deal: Talent, Technology or Traction. Technology refers
to acquisitions where the product, data, technology or IP is core in the acqui-
sition. Traction include revenue growth, access to certain users, a beachhead
in a new market or geography, reference cases and customers, and more. Tal-
ent is a brilliant founding team or specialised knowledge of some kind. The
company does not need to have all three pillars, but usually we look for two of
them.[39]
4.1.1.1 Talent in focus
Focusing on talent in acquisitions of tech-companies is a common denominator throughout
all the interviews. Acquisitions targeting talent is commonly referred to as "acquihires".
In an acquihire, the buyer is primarily motivated by the talent of the seller’s employees
rather than its operating business or the technology. The buyer is looking for a cohesive
group that has proven its ability to work together, combined with technical prowess and
a good culture fit. In a pure acquihire, the business success of the target is secondary at
best [27]. A good example of this is Google who primarily have acquired based on talent
and access to specific domain expertise [54].
Matt Switzer, SVP of Corporate Development at HoouSuite, said:
"Talent is involved in every transaction. It is very rare that we pursue a deal
without that particular T of our framework" (Technology, Talent, Traction).
[39]
The importance of talent in acquisitions is also confirmed by Bram Sugarman, Director of
Corporate Development Lead at Shopify, who said:
"Acquihires are incredibly attractive and the type of acquisition that we have
done the most of. We look for great product teams and incredibly strong lead-
ers.[38]"
4.1.1.2 Product and Technology
In addition to talent, the most commonly quoted reason for acquisition is due to product
and technology.
Bram Sugarman at Shopify said:
"We use Corporate Development (M&A) as a platform to accelerate our prod-
uct roadmap. Our M&A strategy always start with discussions with the prod-
uct teams to understand the road-map and see in which areas M&A can be
used."[38]
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James Loftus, Corporate Development Lead at Square said: "Corporate Development
doesn’t do deals, product does"[35]
4.1.1.3 Traction and Revenue
For early stage technology companies, acquiring based on revenue growth is unusual.
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg, in an often-repeated quote, told a 2010 audience that
“Facebook has not once bought a company for the company itself" [27].
Bram Sugarmann, at Shopify, said:
We don’t necessarily at all acquired based on revenue [38]
4.1.1.4 Success of acquisitions
Measuring success of the acquisition is key in determining the right earnout metric. Bran
Sugarman, argued that the biggest risk in M& is the integration risk [38]. James Loftus,
Corporate Development Lead at Square, said on the question how they evaluate the post-
acquisition success:
In most acquisitions technology and talent are the main drivers so you can’t re-
ally build a model directly related to the company’s existing revenues and profit.
We measure success of an acquisition by talent, traction and product. For tal-
ent, we ask ourselves the question: are they still here, are they contributing and
are they an important part of our organisation? For Technology/product: Are
we using the technology and functionality the way we expected to and did the
acquisition accelerate our product road-map like we wanted? For traction we
measure KPIs against the model that we developed at the time of the acquisition
and ask ourselves if the results are what we expected them to be.[35]
4.1.2 Valuation and the earnout provision
Pricing early stage technology companies is not a straightforward exercise as the acquisi-
tions rarely are based on revenues and profit. James Loftus at Square said:
"Pricing technology companies is incredibly difficult. The acquisitions are
usually driven by technology or talent so you can’t really build a model directly
related to the existing revenue or profit.[35]"
Eeswaran Navaratnam explained that earnouts are used to avoid companies to falling into
traps where companies "fatten the pig before butchering it". Similarly, to before an IPO,
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when a company is being sold the seller make sure to spend time on the "cosmetics" of
the business. Costs are moved around and short-term improvement are made to make the
numbers look really good in the short run. This is very difficult to sustain for a longer
time which is why acquirers use earnout periods, to see whether the seller can sustain on
the growth trajectory as promised.[36]
4.2 Case study
4.2.1 Introduction to GetAccept
GetAccept is a Swedish software company that was founded in 2015 by a team of four
entrepreneurs. The company was a part of the Y-Combinator’s accelerator in the start
of 2016. Y-combinator is arguably the most prestigious startup accelerator in the world
with an acceptance rate of below 1% and it has fostered companies such as Airbnb, Drop-
Box, Reddit and Stripe. The company released their product in December 2015 and the
founders then moved to Silicon Valley to take part in the accelerator in Mountain View,
CA. The company has two different offices, in Malmö and in San Francisco. GetAccept
has grown rapidly since the start and today they employ more than 30 people. Three out
of the four founders have moved back to Malmö, which now is their headquarter, but they
still have six employee’s left in San Francisco. GetAccept have funded their growth by
raising venture capital from both institutional funds and angel investors from Europe and
America. They have raised capital up to the seed-round and have more than 4000 users.
GetAccept’s product is a sales enablement and e-signing tool that helps salespeople engage
their buyers and track their behaviour. Key product features include legally binding
electronic signatures, document analytics, video introductions, live chat with prospects,
reports, integrations and work-flow management for salespeople. The product’s users are
salespeople who send documents to their potential buyers. GetAccept is also being used
by HR and other functions to sign documents digitally. Most of the customers are based
in the Nordic countries but there are plenty of American customers as well. Customers
tend to be salespeople who struggle to differentiate themselves from other vendors and
those who send large volumes of documents. GetAccept work with many industry verticals
including hotels and hospitality, enterprise software and professional services. The product
is delivered through a SaaS-model where users pay on either a monthly or an annual basis.
The pricing model is based on the number of users within the customer’s company i.e.
the customer pays for each person using the product. This is an example of a variable
pricing axis and gives GetAccept the ability to do up-sell on existing customers. There
are three pricing tiers of the product with different feature sets. When the customer is
new to the product, he or she will get a 14 days trial with full functionality. After 14
days the customer then has the option to start paying for the product or to continue
using the product on a "solo" plan with very limited offering of features. If the customers
start paying for the product they can either choose the "Pro-plan" or the "enterprise-
plan". The enterprise plan is more expensive than the Pro-plan but include more features
such as API integrations. Customers can choose to start either a monthly or an annual
subscription. Many customers start with a monthly subscription to avoid lock-in, and
GetAccept then try to convert these customers into paying on an annual basis. The price
point for an annual contract is about 25% lower than for the monthly contract. This is
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constructed to incentivise customers to bill annually, which has a positive effect on the
customer life-time value. GetAccept also charge a one-time fee in several deals, for API
integrations, implementation, and user on-boarding and training.
GetAccept’s vision is "to be the trend-setter, market leader, and the most wanted partner
for innovative SaaS solutions for Sales Automation and electronic signatures in particular,
and sales in general".[37]
4.2.2 SaaS-metrics
The following metrics has been calculated with data from the CRM and the invoicing
system. The data has then been changed to not reveal any confidential information.
However, the data and metrics that are presented should be seen as a representative
example of what a SaaS-company of the same size as GetAccept could have.
4.2.2.1 MRR
The MRR is calculated as the added MRR (data from the CRM system) including the
MRR churn (data from the invoicing system). In addition to the recurring revenue (MRR),
GetAccept also sell one-time fees for implementation, on-boarding and API-integrations.
The one-time items are excluded in the MRR calculation as it is not a recurring revenue.
The MRR graph shows the total MRR from all countries and includes both annual and
monthly users. The MRR has increased from 45 529 to 133 355 USD from January 2017
to April 2018.
Figure 4.1: MRR Growth: January 2017 - April 2018
The compounded monthly growth rate from January 2017 to April 2018 is 8%. The
monthly growth rate is presented in the chart below. Notably, the monthly growth rate
has high variance and month-on-month growth varies between 5 and 13%. The variation
can be explained by the volatility of sales peoples’ performance.
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Figure 4.2: Monthly MRR Growth Rate: January 2017 - April 2018
The total amount of users is correlating with the MRR as subscriptions are sold on a per
user basis. The correlation between MRR and user growth is not perfect, however, as the
average revenue per user (ARPU) is changing over time.
4.2.2.2 User growth
Figure 4.3: User Growth: January 2017 - April 2018
4.2.2.3 ARPU and ARPA
The average revenue per user (ARPU) has varied between 30 and 41 USD. The change
in ARPU is due to price difference between monthly and annual users and the ratio of
annual to monthly users vary over time. Differences in ARPU can also be explained by
the discount that some customers get if they purchase subscriptions for larger quantities
of users. The ARPU has not increased significantly over time.
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Figure 4.4: Average revenue per user: January 2017 - April 2018
The average revenue per account (ARPA) has improved over the last 16 months. This
is due to a shift in focus to targeting larger customers with more users to increase the
annual contract value (ACV) of every deal. The ARPA for April 2018 is 226 USD and
has increased from 120 in January 2017.
Figure 4.5: Average revenue per account: January 2017 - April 2018
4.2.2.4 Churn
Churn occurs when customers stop paying for their subscriptions. As discussed in section
3.2.2, the monthly simple churn rate does not perfectly reflect reality for a SaaS-business
with high MRR growth. This is because churn rate is calculated based on the incoming
MRR for a particular month, while churn is a lagging indicator from users in the past.
The simple churn rate for GetAccept varies between 0,5 and 2,5 % over time with no
significant improvement.
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Figure 4.6: Monthly Simple MRR churn rate: January 2017 - April 2018
As GetAccept have users on both annual and monthly contracts, not all users can churn
each month since they are tied up on annual subscriptions. Therefore, the available churn
ratio depends on the ratio of annual to monthly users.
Figure 4.7: Monthly Available MRR churn rate: January 2017 - April 2018
Churn Cohort Analysis As discussed in section 3.3.2, cohort analysis is a great way of
understanding the real churn in the business. It compare segments of users to each other
in order to find patterns in user retention. Since GetAccept have users on either monthly or
annual subscriptions, the two types of subscriptions are separated into one cohort analysis
for monthly and one for annual users.
The cohort analysis of monthly users shows that the churn is relatively high. The net
MRR retention rate for most cohorts is below 100% which means that churn is larger than
up-sell for those customers. There is a large difference between different cohorts of users.
The six-month net MRR retention rate varies between 60 and 109% with an average of
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86%. The retention rate has improved somewhat over time. However, it is not a linear
improvement and it is unclear if the improvement is statistical significant.
Figure 4.8: Net MRR Retention Rate (Monthly Users): January 2016 - April 2018
The cohort analysis for annual users shows that the net MRR retention rate for annual
users is significantly higher than for monthly users. When users are on annual subscrip-
tions, they can’t churn until month 13. In month 13, however, the net MRR retention rate
doesn’t drop below 100% in any of the cohorts. This means that annual users have net
negative churn. Net negative churn’s exponential impact on growth is discussed in section
3.2.2.2. However, it is worth noting that only three cohorts have yet come to month 13
which is when its users can start churning. After nine months, the average cohort retention
rate is 121%. The strong 9 months retention rate indicates that the 13-month retention
rate will be above 100% thus reaching net negative churn for rest of the cohorts as well.
Figure 4.9: Net MRR Retention Rate (Annual Users): January 2016 - April 2018
Averages in cohort analyses can be misleading since the number of users in each cohort
varies greatly. Thus, it can be beneficial to look at the weighted average net MRR retention
rate (WAR-rate). The WAR-rate combines the cohorts and weigh them on number of users
in the cohort. The graph shown can be seen as a representation of how an average user
(or one dollar in MRR) grow over time.
The WAR-rate of annual users show net negative churn as the graph never go below 100%.
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In month 13 there is churn, but the accumulated up-sell during twelve months is larger.
Figure 4.10: Weighted Average Net MRR Retention Rate (Annual Users): January 2016
- April 2018
The WAR-rate of monthly users is significantly lower than that for annual users. The
net positive churn is linear which indicates that there is not one particular month in the
customer journey where users stop subscribing to the product.
Figure 4.11: Weighted Average Net MRR Retention Rate (Monthly Users): January 2016
- April 2018
4.2.2.5 Engagement metrics
For GetAccept, a monthly active user (MAU) us defined as a user who has logged in or
used the product’s API at least three times in a particular month. The engagement ratio
is defined as the percentage of total paying users that are active. Below is a graph of the
engagement ratio plotted over time. As shown in the graph, the engagement ratio has
improved significantly during the fall of 2017 until the start of 2018 and has since then
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been flat. Naturally, the engagement in the product is lower during the summer since less
people work then.
Figure 4.12: Engagement Ratio: June 2017 - April 2018
From the cohort analysis of the engagement ratio, it is clear that users’ engagement their
first month of subscribing has been a key driver in the overall increased engagement ratio.
The six-month engagement rate has not been improved however. Users have become more
active the first three month of subscribing. The user engagement ratio three months and
more into the users’ subscription has not been improved.
Figure 4.13: Engagement Ratio Cohort: June 2017 - April 2018
4.2.2.6 Sales Efficiency
As discussed in section 3.2.4.1, the LTV:CAC ratio builds on several assumptions. There
are also several different ways of calculating the customer acquisition costs and what to
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include in it. The GetAccept CAC include salaries, marketing spend, software tools and
a proportionate part of the fixed costs. Calculating customer life-time value (LTV) is a
theoretical exercise that is practically difficult with net negative churn. To simplify, the
assumption is made that an average user stays for three years. The LTV:CAC calculation
is made on a quarterly basis to average out the monthly variance.
The LTV:CAC ratio is calculated on a quarterly basis and varies between 2.5 and 4.5.
The ratio doesn’t take into account that salespeople generally take between 2-4 months
from start to close their first deal. There is a delay between spent CAC and closed MRR.
Therefore, the LTV:CAC ratio is lower after recruitment since costs occur before the sales
people are closing new deals.
Figure 4.14: LTV:CAC Q1-2017 - Q1-2018
The magic number takes into account the delay between CAC and increase in MRR. The
ratio varies between 1.2 and 1.8 over time which can be considered very favourable.
Figure 4.15: Magic Number: Q1-2017 - Q1-2018
As discussed in section 3.2.4.3, The CAC payback period is inversely correlated to the
magic number. The CAC payback period varies between 7 and 11 months. The relatively
short payback period has a positive effect on cash-flow.
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Figure 4.16: CAC Payback Period: Q1-2017 - Q1-2018

Chapter 5
Analysis
The analysis aims to analyse how earnouts are constructed through both the lens of the
acquirer and the seller. In the second part of this chapter, the analysis is applied to the
empirical data from the case study company.
5.1 Suggesting performance metrics in earnouts for SaaS-
businesses
Earnouts today use traditional financial metrics such as revenue, EBIT, EBIDTA or net in-
come. Some earnouts, particularly in life-science and medical technology, use non-financial
metrics such as product launch or FDA-approval. This study is looking at suggesting more
appropriate metrics for SaaS-businesses, with the basis in Lean Analytics.
A milestone in an M&A earnout is a metric that if achieved would give the seller additional
payments from the buyer. Thus, it is important that the milestone is aligned with value
creation for the acquirer. Measuring value creation is not straightforward since talent
and technology often is involved in the acquisition strategy which can’t be compared to a
financial model. When setting the metric, the author suggests looking at both the seller’s
as well as the buyer’s perspective. Hence, the analysis will start with looking at buyer’s
perspective and different types of acquisition strategies. The author will then look at the
issue from the seller’s perspective by using Lean Analytics to propose a framework for
understanding what stage the company is in, and then suggesting appropriate metrics for
each stage. The analysis is then applied to the case company for which earnout metrics
are suggested as if the company was sold today. The section ends with an analysis of how
to avoid metric manipulation and sub-optimisation.
5.1.1 Types of acquisitions: The buyer’s perspective
As shown in section 4.1, different acquirers will have fundamentally different reasons for
acquiring a company. If a company gets acquired by one of the technology incumbents,
talent and product is often the main driver. If the buyer is an Asian conglomerate, the
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strategy is more likely to be based on market access. If the acquirer is a private equity
firm, the acquisitions are usually based on financial metrics.
As shown in section 4.1, codifying the acquisition strategy before constructing earnout
provisions is important because it defines how success should be measured. The earnout
literature shows that the earnout milestone should be aligned with the buyer’s strategy
and its view on value creation. If the milestone on which the earnout payment is based
is fundamentally different from what the buyer’s want from the acquisition, there will
be misalignment between the entities and an increased post-acquisition integration risk.
Hence, the process for determining milestones in an earnout should start with the acqui-
sition strategy. As discussed in section 4.1.1, the most common acquisition strategies for
early stage technology businesses is acquihires, product or technology acquisitions
and traction acquisitions. Technology refers to acquisitions where the product, data,
technology or IP is core in the acquisition. Traction include revenue growth, access to
certain users, a beachhead in a new market or geography, reference cases and customers,
and more. Acquihires are acquisitions where talent or access to specialised knowledge are
the key drivers. These acquisition strategies are not mutually exclusive, and acquisitions
usually encompass at least two of these dimensions.
5.1.1.1 Acquihires
In an acquihire, the buyer is primarily motivated by the talent of the seller’s employees
rather than its operating business or technology. Many acquisitions have the objective to
access talent in combination with other areas such as product or revenue. These types
of acquisitions are thus not pure acquihires. If talent is the main driver and key value
creator in an acquisition, disagreement around the future growth trajectory of the business
should not impact the valuation. Using financial metrics to determine earnout payments
in a transaction that only focuses on talent would create unnecessary misalignment and
increase integration risk. As shown in section 4.1.1.3, the success of acquihires is generally
measured by how well the acquired team contributes after some time period. This is a
qualitative metric that can’t be decoded into an accounting principle on which an earnout
should be based. It is not feasible to use qualitative metrics such as those around talent
contribution in earnouts due to their subjective nature, as it most certainly would create
disagreement around fulfilment and accounting. Using financial metrics would therefore
create misalignment between the parties and using qualitative metrics around team con-
tribution is not feasible. For these reasons, the author argues that earnut metrics based on
financial metrics or Lean Analytics are inappropriate in acquihires. However, a provision
that makes sure that the sellers get fully paid only if they stay in the company for some
time-period after the acquisition would be appropriate to protect the buyer.
5.1.1.2 Product and technology acquisitions
As shown in section 4.1.1.2, many acquisitions in the early stage technology industry, and
in particular in SaaS, are driven by an urge to accelerate product road-map and to get
access to functionality or technology. Most product acquisitions are not solely based on
the product, but rather a combination of product, technology, talent and traction. There
are several reasons for acquiring a company based on their product such as integrating
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their functionality into an existing platform, augmenting the offering with new features
or use the acquired technology for internal operational excellence. As argued in section
5.1.1, the objectives of the acquisition need to be in focus when determining the metric by
which the success of the seller’s company is measured after acquisition. If the technology
access is the reason for acquisition, it is difficult to use a quantitative metric of success
that is not subjective or easily manipulated by the acquirer. The same logic applies
to acquisitions that are based on functionality, feature or product integration into the
acquirer’s existing offering. It becomes even more difficult to use metrics for earnouts when
the objective of an acquisition is mixed between talent and product. When milestones are
set in such a way that they are subjective and easily manipulated by the acquiring party,
misalignment between the two companies can be created and the integration risk increased.
As argued in section 4.1, the buyer usually acquires a company due to perceived synergies
between both parties. It is highly subjective and difficult to measure how much value that
has been created from these synergies and thus the risk for disagreement and litigation
over the outcome is high. As we have seen from previous research around earnouts, the
amount of earnout deals that lead to litigation and dispute resolution is very high due to
disagreements on accounting issues and definitions of metrics. Hence, the author argues
that using financial metrics or metrics related to synergies between the two parties is most
likely not a good idea at all. However, as argued in section 5.1.1.1, there should be some
kind of provision that makes sure that sellers can’t quit the company after acquisition and
walk away with the all of the money.
5.1.1.3 Traction acquisitions
As argued in section 4.1, it is very unusual for an early stage technology company to be
acquired by larger technology incumbents (Google, SalesForce, Oracle, SAP, Adobe etc.)
based on their revenue. However, traction can be a part of the overall acquisition strategy.
Acquisitions based on traction are also more common when foreign companies acquire
for market access. Private equity firms have traditionally not been active in the early
stage technology ecosystem, but recently the M& activity from PE-firms has increased.
Depending on the original objective of the merger, an earnout based on financial metrics
from Lean Analytics such as MRR, MRR growth or User growth may be appropriate. If the
acquirer has a strong balance sheet with liquid assets and aim to scale the seller’s business
post-acquisition, sales efficiency metrics such as magic number can be used in earnouts if
the seller’s current business model is not capital efficient enough. Some acquisitions are
made on the premise that they are believed to add to the financial metrics of the acquirer.
In those situations, earnouts are appropriate to use as it bridges the gap between the
seller’s and the buyer’s valuation expectations. When the acquisitions strategy is a mix of
product and traction, MRR can be used as one of the earnout metrics. An example can
be when the strategy is to keep the companies independent until a critical mass of users
is reached, and then the seller’s product is integrated into the acquirer’s existing software
product. In those cases, it can be very relevant to have metrics in the earnout such as
user growth or MRR.
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5.1.2 The seller’s perspective: Characteristics to consider when sug-
gesting earnout metrics
As shown in section 3.2.2, the important metrics depends on what stage the startup is in.
Therefore, in addition to the buyer’s perspective and the acquisition strategy, the seller’s
product and the nature of the company need to be carefully considered when choosing an
appropriate metric in an M&A earnout.
5.1.2.1 Lean Analytics’ stages and earnout metrics
As discussed in section 3.1.2, the stage of the seller’s business is critical to determining
what metrics to focus on. This is because the metric that are important (the OMTM)
change over the lifetime of a company. In an earnout, it is of great importance that the
chosen milestones correlate with success of the seller’s company and the buyer’s objectives.
As such, the stage of the company is crucial to consider when determining the earnout
metric.
If the company is still in the empathy or stickiness stage and get acquired, it will by
definition not be a "traction acquisition" but rather an acquihire or a technology access
acquisition. If the company is in the stickiness stage with low engagement and high
churn, the focus needs to be on improving the product’s stickiness before trying scale.
As previously discussed, a provision that makes sure that the sellers get fully paid only
if they stay in the company for some time-period after the acquisition should be used
to protect the buyer. Earnout milestones based on financial metrics or Lean Analytics
should not be used in acquisitions of companies in these stages. However, the metrics from
Lean Analytics can be used to determine whether or not the company has moved beyond
the stickiness stage. The metrics that should be analysed are the engagement metrics.
Because different products have inherently different usage patterns, it is impossible to
give a general benchmark of engagement and retention that a company should have to
have moved beyond the stickiness stage. A good starting point is the engagement ratio
should be somewhat continuously high and that the engagement WAR-rate doesn’t show
steep drops after a couple of months. Cohort analysis is the best way of understanding
the real engagement patterns and should be used to decide if the company has moved
beyond the stickiness stage or not.
The virality stage is passed when the product has found some kind of virality, whether
inherent, artificial or word of mouth. This is very difficult to track quantitatively due to
the complex nature of the metric.
As shown in section 3.3.3, engagement is a good stickiness metrics as it is a leading
indicator of churn and it should be used in the early stages of a company when there
is not enough data to see what the real churn is. When the company has acquired a
significant amount of customers, the simple churn rate and Net MRR Retention
Rate should be analysed. The monthly simple churn rate should be below 3-4% for
the company to move beyond the early revenue stage. As argued before in this study,
the simple churn rate is flawed at high MRR growth which is why it is essential to look
at the cohort analysis of Net MRR Retention Rate, as well as the WAR-rate.
If the 12 months WAR-rate is above 85%, the company has low enough churn to start
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looking into sales efficiency. Naturally, these general recommendations do not apply to
every SaaS-product. The nature of the product and the customers must be considered
when deciding upon what a good churn rate looks like. If the churn is too high but the
product has high MRR or number of users, churn metrics could theoretically be used
in certain cases as a metric in earnouts. However, there are complexities in the metric
that makes it difficult to track objectively, which makes it practically difficult to use the
metric.
As shown in section 3.2.3, companies in the early revenue stage, with low churn but
low sales efficiency, should not attempt to scale. Sales efficiency metrics could then be
appropriate metrics if the acquirer wants to scale the seller’s business after acquisition, but
the current sales model is too capital inefficient. If the seller believes that they through
synergies with the acquirer can increase the sales efficiency and make the model scalable,
sales efficiency metrics in earnouts can arguably lead to alignment between both parties
and focus the efforts on what matters for the acquirer. The most commonly used sales
efficiency metrics are the LTV:CAC ratio, theMagic Number and the CAC Payback
Period. As argued in section 3.3.4.1, the LTV:CAC metric builds on several assumptions
and can easily be subject to manipulation. This makes it an inappropriate choice for metric
in an earnout. The Magic Number is a better metric to use in an earnout if the company
has poor sales efficiency and need to improve it before attempting to scale. Magic number
is a much simpler metric than the LTV:CAC ratio, however the cost allocation component
is slightly problematic and needs to be clearly defined. The CAC payback ratio has the
same problem with cost allocation as the Magic Number. The CAC Payback Period
is very similar to the Magic Number but the Magic Number is somewhat more simplistic
and easy to define. Thus, in the previously hypothetical case, the Magic Number would
be more appropriate as a metric in an earnout. If the Magic Number can be used as a
metric in an earnout it must be clearly defined as the cost allocation part of it can lead
to suboptimisation, which will be discussed in the upcoming sections.
As argued in section 3.2.3, if the company has favourable sales efficiency metrics it is
ready to go on to the early parts of the scale stage and is ready to scale up the customer
acquisition model. It has proven that the sales model is capital efficient enough to invest
in growth. This is generally the case when the LTC:CAC ratio is higher than 3, the Magic
Number higher than 1 and the CAC Payback Period lower than twelve months. If that is
the case, the primary objective is MRR growth which also should be the earnout metric.
The suggested framework for applying Lean Analytics to earnout metrics is synthesised
below:
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Figure 5.1: Process for determining earnouts in SaaS
5.1.3 How to avoid reaching milestones through sub-optimisation
As we have discussed previously, one of the biggest problems with how earnouts are de-
signed today is that a significant amount of them lead to disagreement over outcome,
dispute resolution and litigation. This is usually due to: lack of clarity around how
earnout metrics are defined, as well as the post-acquisition control issues.
5.1.3.1 Post-acquisition control
As shown in section 3.4.4, the seller is vulnerable to the buyer’s actions and decisions
post-closing, which may impact the likelihood of reaching milestones and receiving earnout
payments. If the milestones aren’t met, and sellers are deprived on expected pay-outs,
the sellers can argue that the buyer didn’t do enough to ensure the earnout was met.
The best way to work around this issue is for the two companies to remain independent
entities after the acquisition. However, the aim of the acquisition is usually to integrate the
company into the acquirer’s organisation and use their product functionality, technology,
team and capabilities. Therefore, this is not always a viable option. The earnout provision
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usually include good faith and reasonable effort provisions to protect against opportunistic
behaviour.
5.1.3.2 Clarity around the metric definition
As shown in section 3.4.3, a metric need to be clearly defined and understood by both
parties. There must be complete transparency around how the metric is calculated and
around how the accounting is done to calculate it. When the earnout provision is written,
examples of outcomes should be provided to both parties to exemplify metric calculation.
A third party can be used for potential dispute resolution. It is difficult to user qualitative
metrics as they are subjective, hard to define and are likely to lead to disagreements
on whether or not the milestones have been achieved. Simplicity is very important as
complicated metrics lead to a lack of clarity and understanding, which in its turn lead
to a higher probability of disagreement and litigation over outcome. Therefore, metrics
that build on assumptions such as the LTV:CAC ratio should not be used as milestones in
earnouts. The metrics that are being used should also preferably be lagging indicators since
they track performance over the earnout period. If metrics that involve cost allocation is
used (such as the Magic Number or net profit), there must be clear definitions from the
start on what costs are to be included. Generally, the more complex the cost allocation
becomes the more likely it is to lead to opportunistic behaviour and sub-optimisation.
5.1.3.3 Inversely correlating metrics
A combination of metrics can also be used to avoid reaching the metrics through sub-
optimisation or "creative accounting". If the product is in the stickiness stage, the metrics
used could be a combination of engagement ratio and simple churn. If the company
tries to lower churn in the short run by adding a lot of users who will churn after the earnout
period is over, the engagement ratio will go down. If the company tries to improve the
engagement ratio by dropping users who are not engaged from the product, the simple
churn ratio will go up. Combining these two metrics makes it difficult for the seller to
reach milestones by opportunistic behaviour and sub-optimising.
5.2 Applying Lean Analytics to an earnout for GetAccept
GetAccept, as discussed in section 4, is a SaaS-business that is funded by venture capital.
Because they are funded by venture capital, they will need to seek liquidity at some point
to be able to return the money to its shareholders. They have more than 3000 users and
around 150 000 USD in monthly recurring revenue. They are a perfect candidate for an
early stage M&A which makes the attempt to set metrics in a fictional earnout a highly
relevant exercise.
As discussed before, both the acquisition strategy of the acquirer and the seller’s perspec-
tive needs to be considered when determining the earnout metric:
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5.2.1 The seller’s perspective
In section 5.1.2, the importance of understanding what stage the seller is in when deter-
mining earnout metrics was discussed. The theoretical framework from Lean Analytics
five stage’s (section 3.1) is appropriate for this exercise. Since GetAccept have more than
4000 paying users, they clearly have moved beyond the empathy stage.From the empirical
data in section 4.3.5, we see that the engagement ratio is around 70& which can be con-
sidered high. The engagement cohort analysis further confirm our view that GetAccept’s
product is sticky enough, and that they thus have moved beyond the second stage in Lean
Analytics: the stickiness stage. One of GetAccept’s key product features is electronic
signatures. This creates inherent virality (section 3.1.7) in the product as every product
usage creates a marketing opportunity. The more their product is being used, the more
exposure their brand gets. Therefore, GetAccept have arguably crossed the virality stage.
From the cohort analysis of the Net MRR Retention Rate, it is observed that GetAccept
have net negative churn and an annual WAR-rate of 108% for annual users, but an annual
WAR-rate of 75% for monthly users. Overall, this is indicative of a very low churn and
GetAccept have arguably moved beyond the early revenue stage. The empirical data pre-
sented in section 4.3.6, show that GetAccept’s LTV:CAC ratio, the magic number and the
CAC payback time are favourable. It indicates that the sales model is working and that
the company is ready to scale. The LTV:CAC ratio is around 3, which can be considered
good enough. The magic number is above 1 and the CAC payback time is is below 12
months. This is generally a sign that the company has found an effective paid engine of
growth and that they are ready to attempt to scale. GetAccept has arguably moved on
to the early stages of scale.
At the revenue stage, the most important metrics are sales efficiency and MRR/user
growth. The most appropriate metric for GetAccept, as they are in the early scale stage,
would be MRR or MRR growth. Number of users and user growth wouldn’t be as appro-
priate since that could lead to a price decrease in order to attract more users, which could
hurt revenues and long-term profitability.
5.2.2 The buyer’s perspective
Naturally, the acquisitions strategy must be considered when choosing an appropriate
earnout metric. As discussed before, earnouts for acquihires should not use Lean Analytics’
metrics as earnout metrics. Product acquisitions where the seller’s product is meant to
be integrated as a feature into the buyer’s existing products, usually are not well-suited
for these types of metrics in earnouts either. For traction acquisitions however, where the
acquisitions strategy is market access or revenue based, Lean Analytics’ metrics are very
appropriate for earnouts. Target MRR or MRR growth is probably the best metric to use
in this case.
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5.3 Comparison to traditional earnout provisions
Traditional earnouts use GAAP-metrics such as revenue, EBITDA or net income. The
benefit of using Lean Analytics’ metrics compared to the traditional GAAP, is that they
better reflect the reality of the recurring revenue model and align incentives after the
acquisition.
5.3.1 Traditional GAAP financial metrics are not appropriate for SaaS
Due to the delayed cash-flow in subscription-based models, traditional accounting princi-
ples are not adequate to examine the health of a growing SaaS-business. The Generally
Accepted Accounting Principle (GAAP) metrics simply does not tell whether the business
model is viable. By using the GAAP, a SaaS business may look like it is performing very
poorly as measured by revenue and margins, where in fact the business model is profitable
and viable. For a traditional business using GAAP, the revenues are calculated based on
sales that is already invoiced. In SaaS, however, customers often pay on a monthly or
annual basis. Therefore, closed sales for a subscription-based model might only be the
contract value of the first monthly payment whereas the customer lifetime value may be
significantly higher if the customer stays over a long period of time. Repeat purchases are
fundamental to the business model and GAAP does not correctly take that into account.
Thus, several new ways of looking at SaaS unit economics have been developed by venture
capitalists and startup CEOs. The MRR metric is also a better indicator of how much
revenue the company will have in the future. If, for example, the company doesn’t sell
anything from January to November and then in December they sell for an MRR of 100
000 USD, the total revenue for that year would be 100 000. If revenue was used as a
metric, and 200% growth as a milestone, the earnout milestone would be a revenue of 300
000 USD for the upcoming year. Next year, however, the company will earn 100 000 USD
every month from the existing recurring revenue, which is an annual recurring revenue of
1 200 000 USD. Thus, revenue is not an appropriate metric for projecting what the future
revenue of a SaaS-company should be and should therefore not be used as a metric in an
earnout.
The revenue metric is a lagging indicator of income while MRR is an indicator of how much
recurring revenue the company at one given point have. In the case of GetAccept, they
have both recurring revenue and one-time fees, with the majority coming from recurring
revenue. If the earnout metric would be revenue, they could reach the goal by focusing
on adding high implementation costs which would add to the revenue metric this year.
However, that would be sub-optimisation as it is bad for the business in the long run. For
SaaS-businesses, it is clear that revenue is an inferior metric compared to MRR.
5.3.2 Aligning incentives
In order to align the post-acquisition financial incentives of the seller with the value created
for the acquirer, the metrics used in an earnout must be the metrics that should they
improved would significantly increase the value of the company for the acquirer. The
success of the acquired company within the earnout length time-frame should be defined
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by the metrics used in the earnout. Thus, the acquisition strategy should be tied to the
metrics in the earnouts. The milestones will create a financial incentive for the seller
to improve on those very metrics, and as previously argued: What gets measured gets
improved". It is important for the post-acquisition success that the financial incentives
of the seller are aligned with the success of the business so that they try to improve the
metrics that matter for the acquirer. Since traditional GAAP metrics such as revenue and
net income does not reflect the health of the SaaS-business, they should not be used in
earnouts. Having revenue or profit as an earnout metric without considering the stage of
the company would in many cases lead to pre-mature and capital inefficient scaling that
can be detrimental to the business.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
The conclusion aims to answer the initial research questions. It also provides an example
of how the findings can be applied by constructing a fictional earnout for the case study
company.
6.1 Suggesting appropriate performance metrics in earnouts
for SaaS-businesses
The process of determining the earnout metric should to start with the acquisition strategy.
The acquirer should codify its objectives and decide what success looks like. For pure
"acquihires", earnouts are not appropriate though a mechanism for keeping the people in
the acquiring company should be used. For acquisitions based on the product, earnouts
should be avoided if possible as the metrics for success is of qualitative nature. If the
acquisitions strategy is to add to financial metrics of the acquirer, earnouts are a good
way of bridging the valuation expectation gap. The stage of the seller’s company must
be considered since the metrics that matter differ between stages in the company. To
understand what stage the company is in, Lean Analytics’ metrics can be used. Financial
metrics, churn, engagement metrics and sales efficiency metrics should be analysed to
understand where the company is at. The key to setting the right earnout metric is thus
to understand the acquisition strategy and the metrics that are important for the seller.
The process of selecting earnout metrics is summarised in the framework below.
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Figure 6.1: Process for determining earnouts in SaaS
After the earnout metrics is decided, all parties involved in the M&A process must pay
attention to metric definitions and avoid post-closing control issues. Metrics that involve
cost allocation, such as bottom line growth or sales efficiency metrics, should generally be
avoided. If they are used, the definition must be clear and both parties aware of how costs
are to be allocated during the earnout period. The metrics should not be qualitative or
subjective, and both parties must agree upon clear definitions and accounting principles.
Furthermore, metrics that build on assumptions should not be used. Both parties must
make sure that the metrics in the earnout is aligned with the acquisition strategy and
the success of both companies. The earnout provision should also include good faith and
reasonable effort provisions to protect against opportunistic behaviour.
6.2 Applying Lean Analytics to the process of determining
earnout metrics
Some metrics from Lean Analytics can be used as metrics in earnouts. However, most of
them are easily manipulated and too complicated which can lead to an increased risk of
disagreement over outcome and legal litigation. The MRR metric, Simple Churn Rate and
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the Magic Number can be used in earnouts depending on what stage the company is in.
Simple Churn and the Magic Number are only suggestions, however, for metrics that can
be used in very special occasions situations. MRR would in most cases be an appropriate
metric to replace the traditional revenue, EBIT or profit metric. Even if Lean Analytics’
metrics are not used as earnout metrics, they should be used to determine what stage the
seller’s company is in, which in turn is an important part in determining the right metric.
6.3 The earnout metric for GetAccept - with Lean Analytics
In a hypothetical acquisition of GetAccept, Lean Analytics can be used to determine the
earnout metric. As discussed in section 5.3, GetAccept have strong engagement metrics,
net negative churn and favourable sales efficiency. Hence they are currently in the scale
stage and MRR is an appropriate metric to use if they were to be acquired in a "traction
acquisition". The metric should be set so that the seller would receive additional payments
if they continue or accelerate the growth pace of the previous year. The compounded
annual growth rate since January 2017 has been 8%. Assuming an earnout length of 2
years, the MRR milestone would be 915 000 USD in MRR.

Chapter 7
Implications of study and future
research
In this chapter the author discusses the implications and limitations of the study. Further-
more, suggestions for future research are provided.
7.1 Implications of the findings
By choosing more appropriate metrics for SaaS-companies in M&A earnouts, the author
has argued that there will be increased alignments between both parties which increases
the likelihood of success.
The academic contribution of this study is to combine several academic disciplines such
as innovation engineering, financial accounting, corporate finance, data science and law,
to better understand all stakeholders involved in an M&A transaction of software compa-
nies. The traditional management research has been geared towards the manufacturing
companies of the 20th century. During the last 15 years there has been an increase in
literature trying to understand and manage new technology ventures. However, the cor-
porate finance theory has been lagging behind and has not been adapted to unconventional
technology ventures where financial models cannot be applied as usual. This study also
aimed to make early stage transactions easier which would de-risk entrepreneurship. The
author hopes to bridge the gap between traditional corporate finance and management
scholars, and the practitioners that have learned by experience.
The practical contribution of this study is to provide an alternative way of constructing
earnouts for SaaS-businesses, that better reflect the reality of the business. Force-fitting
metrics or frameworks onto businesses is rarely a good idea, yet this is exactly what
happens when traditional GAAP-metrics are used for subscription businesses. Setting
milestones in transactions must start with understanding the acquisition strategy and
the seller’s company, and then determine the milestones and metrics - rather than the
other way around. The study has also examined and discussed the possibility of reaching
metric through sup-optimisation and opportunistic behaviour. By doing so, the author
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hopes to shed light on the absurdity that earnouts in many cases simply converts today’s
disagreement over price into tomorrow’s legal litigation over the outcome. Technology
ventures should focus on innovation and growth, not spending time and money on legal
litigation. The propensity for earnouts leading to litigation is a sign that the current
way they are structured is broken, and entrepreneurs must be aware of the limitations of
earnouts.
7.2 Limitations of the findings
It is hard to discuss the validity and reliability of a qualitative study as the results do
not consist of measurable and statistically significant data. The conclusion builds on very
broad simplifications of what acquisition strategies in M&A look like. The reality is much
more nuanced and complex than three types of acquisition strategies. The objective of the
acquisition is usually a mix of different aspects which makes it difficult to categorise them
into one field. Most acquisitions are based on perceived synergies between the entities
and have specific integration goals in mind. The acquisitions strategy also depends on
who the acquirer is. Another limitation in this study is that M&A is very rare in the
early stages. Most acquisitions happen at the scale stage of Lean Analytics, unless they
are pure acquihires or technology access acquisitions. Thus, in practice it is very rare
that acquisitions would happen at the stage where churn or the magic number would be
appropriate earnout metrics.
The more complex metrics become, the easier they are to manipulate. One of the key
problems with earnouts is how frequent they lead to legal litigation and disagreements
over the outcome. As discussed, this is often due to a lack of clarity around metric
definition and calculation. Many metrics from Lean Analytics are conceptual. They
ought to be used as a mental model to understand the fundamentals of the business
model. Those metrics are not suitable to be used in earnouts. The Magic Number takes
both customer acquisition costs and increase MRR into account. This metric can easily be
manipulated by lowering customer acquisition costs during the last phase of the earnout
period. Drastically lowering the CAC at the end of the earnout period would most likely
not yield in lower MRR growth during the earnout length since there is a delay between
money spent on customer acquisition and increased MRR. This clearly shows that the
magic number can be subject to manipulation and opportunistic behaviour, which creates
misalignment, hinder integration and can lead to litigation. Thus, the magic number is
a metric that would be good to use in theory, but in practice it can actually worsen the
problem with litigation. The churn rate can also be subject to metric manipulation by
increasing the total MRR by lowering the price. However, since adding MRR decreases
the simple churn rate at a given absolute number of churn, the seller will also have an
incentive to increase MRR in order to decrease the simple churn rate. This is why MRR
churn should be used and not account or user churn rate. If the metrics are not clearly
defined and there are limitations on what can be done with regards to manipulation and
cost allocation, using these metrics can be counter-productive to its purpose. Using MRR
is probably the most viable and appropriate earnout metrics. The MRR metric is much
more difficult to manipulate than the magic number and the simple churn rate. It is also
better representing the reality of the business than GAAP-metric such as revenue, EBIT
or profit.
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Using complex and very specific metrics with a long earnout period might restrict the
entrepreneurs’ degrees of operating freedom. It is important that the entrepreneurs have
the freedom to iterate, pivot and refine their hypothesis before reaching product market
fit. If the entrepreneurs have a financial incentive to reach a certain metric, they will most
likely optimise over that specific metric with less regards to other important aspects of the
business. Optimising over one or a few metrics with disregard to other areas is rarely a
good idea since reality is much more nuanced than just improving upon a couple of KPIs.
By putting constraints on the entrepreneurs’ freedom to develop the business, earnouts
can actually hinder innovation. Using specific product or sales efficiency metrics, such as
churn and the magic number, can be counter-productive as it restricts the entrepreneurs’
ability to act on new information and opportunities that come up. It can also hinder
successful integration with the acquirer..
7.3 Suggestions for future research
This study has been focused on understanding the fundamentals of SaaS-businesses through
Lean Analytics. It has put the seller’s company in centre of the analysis and disregarded
a lot of the legal aspects that are involved in the earnout provision. The thesis would be
well-complemented by additional research from the legal perspective to understand the
practical implications of Lean Analytics in earnouts. The validity and applicability of
the thesis would increase if future research would analyse the practical feasibility of im-
plementing these metrics into earnout provisions and transaction agreements. There are
other aspects of the earnout that need to be considered such as the earnout length, tiers,
caps, and thresholds. The implications of using Lean Analytics’ metrics in earnouts on
post-closing control issues need to be analysed further to make the conclusions applicable.
Furthermore, future research should be made into understanding the accounting issues
that using Lean Analytics’ metrics in earnouts could create. In theory, Lean Analytics’
metrics in earnouts can be used, but the practical implications of the transaction must
be studied to understand the full picture of how transactions can be constructed to align
incentives and avoid legal litigation.
7.4 Concluding reflection
The purpose of this study was to provide a framework for using earnouts in SaaS M&A
that is fit for purpose and constructed for innovation rather than built from the traditional
principles of accounting and finance. The thesis has focused on understanding the funda-
mentals of the SaaS-business by using Lean Analytics and then together with empirical
data from acquisition strategies create a inter-disciplinary and synthesised picture of how
to better create earnouts designed for innovation. However, as argued before, optimising
over a few metrics with financial incentives can lead to a disregard of other important
aspect within the company. Using sophisticated metrics from Lean Analytics can restrict
the degrees of freedom for the entrepreneur and increase the chances of disagreement over
outcome. Over-complicating the metrics could backfire and create more misalignment
with higher risk of legal litigation, which would harm innovation. The case study has
shown that it is possible to use metrics from Lean Analytics in earnouts. In pratice, it is
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very likely that MRR is the best metric to use. Using other metrics would likely lead to
worse outcomes than using traditional GAAP-metrics due to sub-optimisation and metric
manipulation.
This study has shown that there is not one perfect way of bridging risk between sellers
and buyers in earnouts. What works perfect in theory, often become problematic and
unfeasible in practice. It is clear, however, that an interdisciplinary approach to solving
the problem can be beneficial as there are many stakeholders from different functional
departments involved in the process.
The author believes that metrics for subscription businesses should be different from the
traditional metrics used in management theory and manufacturing companies. Under-
standing the fundamentals of a subscription models has become more important for ven-
ture capitalists, investment bankers, lawyers and entrepreneurs in general. In addition
to providing a framework for constructing earnouts, the author hopes that this thesis
has given the reader an insight into the world of SaaS and subscription models. These
companies will form the giants of tomorrow, and traditional management disciplines are
insufficient to understanding technology ventures.
Chapter 8
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Chapter 9
Appendix
In this chapter the appendices are presented
9.1 Interview guides
The following questions were used as an interview guide for the conducted interviews.
• What are the main acquisition strategies for technology incumbents acquiring star-
tups?
• What objectives have been most common in acquisitions, in your experience?
• For what strategic purpose do you use M&A?
• How would you measure success of an acquisition?
• In your experience - what are the biggest problems with the way earnouts are used
today?
• In what types of acquisitions would you say earnouts are inappropriate to use?
• Is revenue a common componend in acquisitions?
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